




FOREWORD: THE FORMS OF JUSTICE
Owen M. Fiss*
T HE Constitution establishes the structure of govern-
ment. It creates the agencies of government, describes
their functions, and determines their relationships. The Con-
stitution also identifies the values that will inform and limit
this governmental structure. The values that we find in our
Constitution - liberty, equality, due process, freedom of
speech, no establishment of religion, property, no impairments
of the obligation of contract, security of the person, no cruel
and unusual punishment - are ambiguous. They are capable
of a great number of different meanings. They often con-
flict. There is a need - a constitutional need - to give them
specific meaning, to give them operational content, and, where
there is a conflict, to set priorities.
All of us, both as individuals and institutional actors, play
a role in this process. In modern society, where the state is
all-pervasive, these values determine the quality of our social
existence - they truly belong to the public - and as a con-
sequence, the range of voices that give meaning to these values
is as broad as the public itself. The legislative and executive
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branches of government, as well as private institutions, have
a voice; so should the courts. Judges have no monopoly on
the task of giving meaning to the public values of the Consti-
tution, but neither is there reason for them to be silent. They
too can make a contribution to the public debate and inquiry.
Adjudication is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values. Structural reform - the subject
of this essay - is one type of adjudication, distinguished by
the constitutional character of the public values, and even
more importantly, by the fact that it involves an encounter
between the judiciary and the state bureaucracies. The judge
tries to give meaning to our constitutional values in the oper-
ation of these organizations. Structural reform truly acknowl-
edges the bureaucratic character of the modern state, adapting
traditional procedural forms to the new social reality, and in
the years ahead promises to become a central - maybe the
central - mode of constitutional adjudication.
Structural reform is premised on the notion that the quality
of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation
of large-scale organizations, not just by individuals acting
either beyond or within these organizations. It is also premised
on the belief that our constitutional values cannot be fully
secured without effectuating basic changes in the structures of
these organizations. The structural suit is one in which a
judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of consti-
tutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization
to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present
institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by
which these reconstructive directives are transmitted.
As a genre of constitutional litigation, structural reform has
its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary effort
to translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education' into
practice. This effort required the courts to radically transform
the status quo, in effect to reconstruct social reality. The
courts had to overcome the most intense resistance, and, even
more problematically, they had to penetrate and restructure
large-scale organizations, public school systems. The imagery
was rural and individualistic - the black child walking into
an all-white school - but the reality, especially by the mid-
ig6o's, as the focus shifted to the urban centers and the nation
at large, was decidedly bureaucratic.
Brown was said to require nothing less than the transfor-
mation of "dual school systems" into "unitary, nonracial school
systems," and that entailed thoroughgoing organizational re-
form. It required new procedures for the assignment of stu-
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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dents; new criteria for the construction of schools; reassignment
of faculty; revision of the transportation systems to accom-
modate new routes and new distances; reallocation of resources
among schools and among new activities; curriculum modifi-
cation; increased appropriations; revision of interscholastic
sports schedules; new information systems for monitoring the
performance of the organization; and more. 2 In time it was
understood that desegregation was a total transformational
process in which the judge undertook the reconstruction of an
ongoing social institution. Desegregation required a revision
of familiar conceptions about party structure, new norms gov-
erning judicial behavior, and new ways of looking at the
relationship between rights and remedies.
No one had a road map at the outset. No one had a clear
vision of all that would be involved in trying to eradicate the
caste system embedded in a state bureaucracy, or how the
attempt would transform the mode of adjudication. The sec-
ond Brown decision 3 was far from such a vision: it was but
a recognition of the magnitude of the task and an attempt to
buy time. It delegated the reconstructive task to the lower
federal judges. They, in turn, discovered what the task re-
quired and adjusted traditional procedural forms to meet the
felt necessities. Legitimacy was equated with need, and, in
that sense, procedure became dependent upon substance. It
was the overriding commitment to racial equality that moti-
vated the procedural innovation and that was seen as the
justification for the departures from tradition.
At critical junctures - Cooper v. Aaron,4 the faculty de-
segregation cases of the mid-i96o's, s and Green v. County
School Board6 - the Warren Court stepped in. The Justices
emphasized their continuous commitment to Brown and ac-
knowledged the comprehensiveness of the reform required: the
dual school system would have to be eradicated "root and
branch." 7 The process continued and, in time, the lessons of
school desegregation were transferred to other contexts: to pro-
tect the security of the person and home from police abuses,
to realize the ideal of humane treatment in prisons and mental
2 See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.)
(per curiam) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam sub fnom. Wallace v. United States,
389 U.S. 215 (1967); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. I966), aff'd per curiam, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967).
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (i955).
4 358 U.S. I (1958).
5 United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Bradley
v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam).
6 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
7 Id. at 438.
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hospitals, to ensure procedural due process in the welfare
administration, and to equalize expenditures in state educa-
tional systems. In that way school desegregation became a
vitally important occasion for procedural innovations that tran-
scended the substantive claim, for the emergence of a whole
new conception of adjudication, one that was particularly
suited to cope with a new unit of constitutional law - the
state bureaucracy.
Today we are at a new phase in the evolutionary proc-
ess. The change did not occur in 1969, immediately upon the
ascension of Warren Burger to the Chief Justiceship. In fact,
during the first few years, in cases like Swann8 and Keyes, 9
the Supreme Court strongly supported the emergent model of
adjudication; in the early i97o's structural reform continued
to occur in the lower courts at a brisk pace and with a broad
reach, including more and more state bureaucracies. By the
mid- and late-i97o's, however, a new position had formed on
the Supreme Court; a strong bloc of Justices, sometimes ob-
taining support from the center of the Court, sought to reverse
the processes that were still afoot in the lower courts. The
major assault occurred, ironically enough, in the school deseg-
regation cases of the mid-i97o's - the Detroit metropolitan
case, 10 the Pasadena case,11 and the Dayton case. 12 In other
cases, in racial areas and elsewhere, the pattern has been
mixed: in a police case the Burger Court was sharply critical
of structural reform; 13 in a prison case it was strongly sup-
portive; 14 and so on and so on. 15  In most the Court was
deeply divided; even when structural reform survived, there
was usually a high-pitched dissent.
8 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-6 (x97). See
also Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (197I).
9 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (I973).
10 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (974).
11 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
12 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (I977).
13 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). This case involved the Philadelphia police
department, and, with a touch of bravado, the Department of Justice recently filed,
in the name of the United States, a similar suit against the Philadelphia police
department. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1979, at Ai, col. 2. The change from private to
government plaintiff may avoid some of the difficulties of the first suit, such as those
pertaining to the majority's view of the "case or controversy" requirement or the
dictates of "Our Federalism," see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1154-6o
(i977), but it may cause some difficulties of its own, see Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S.
925 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
14 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). On other occasions, the Court has been
more ambivalent towards judicial review of prison conditions. Compare Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (977) (obligation to provide law libraries or legal assistance);
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The Burger Court counterassault - sniping is probably a
more accurate description - has not sealed the door on struc-
tural reform - indeed, just this past Term two broad deseg-
regation plans' squeaked by, one involving Columbus, 16 and
the other involving a return of the Dayton case 17 - but it has
changed our vision. In the midst of the Warren Court era,
the procedural innovations implicit in structural reform were
almost invisible. Each step was small and incremental; each
seemed unquestionably correct. Now that is past. We have
a clearer understanding of the i96O's. The counterassault has
brought into focus the changes in adjudication that occurred
during those times and, even more importantly, it has called
them into question. We have been forced, as perhaps we
should, to examine the legitimacy of those changes. That is
why the academy is today filled with talk about procedure.
1 8
That is why we believe we are at a historic moment, a turning
point in the history of procedure - not because we are in the
midst of an intellectual revolution, but because we are in the
midst of a counterrevolution; not because we are at the verge
of a new discovery, but because the discovery of an earlier era
is now in jeopardy.
I. ADJUDICATION AND PUBLIC VALUES
As a type of adjudication, structural reform is in large part
distinguished by the effort to give meaning to constitutional
values in the operation of large-scale organizations. This or-
Wolff v. McDonnell, 428 U.S. 539 (i974) (minimum standards required for disciplinary
proceedings); and Procunier v. Martinez, 4x6 U.S. 396 (x974) (mail censorship regu-
lations invalidated), with Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S.
I9 (1977) (regulations prohibiting prisoners from soliciting other inmates to join union
sustained); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (no right to factfinding hearing
when prisoner is transferred); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (2974) (prohibition
on press and other media interviews upheld).
Is See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (public housing); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975) (pretrial detention); Spomer v. Littleton, 424 U.S. 514 (1974)
(prosecutor's office); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (i974) (state court system);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (National Guard).
16 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
17 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (,979). Prison reform did
not fare that well. See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (various regulations
affecting pretrial detainees sustained).
Is My colleague Robert Cover and I have sought to capture the academic flurry
in our new book, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979). Following the completion
of that book in January of this year, at least three issues of major law journals
appeared which were devoted to procedure: Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 9o5
(1979); 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978) (issue containing three Articles and one student-
written Special Project on procedure) (received in February 1979); Private Alternatives
to the Judicial Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1979).
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ganizational aspiration has important consequences for the
form of adjudication, raising new and distinct problems of
legitimacy. But much of the criticism of structural reform,
and what I wish to begin with, focuses on that characteristic
common to all forms of injunctive litigation: the fact that so
much power is vested in judges.
The great and modern charter for ordering the relation
between judges and other agencies of government is footnote
four of Carolene Products.19 The greatness derives not from
its own internal coherence, or any theoretical insight, but from
its historical position. The footnote codified the hard fought
victory of the Progressives and seemed to provide a framework
for the judicial activism that was about to transpire. The
Progressives, and their 1930's successors, the New Dealers,
fought their battles in the legislature, and the footnote reflected
the terms of their victory: it posited the supremacy of the
legislature. The role of the courts, even on constitutional ques-
tions, was defined in terms of "legislative failure": the courts
should defer to the legislative branch, the footnote proclaimed,
unless there is some reason for assuming that the processes of
the legislature are inadequate. The footnote identified two
instances of legislative failure: abridgment of the right to vote
and victimization of a discrete and insular minority, a group
disabled from forming coalitions and thus from effectively par-
ticipating in majoritarian politics.
Although Carolene Products involved a challenge to a stat-
ute, it has been taken, as perhaps it was intended, to be a
more general statement on the role of courts in our political
system. The theory of legislative failure should be understood
as a general presumption in favor of majoritarianism: the leg-
islature should be seen as standing for those agencies of gov-
ernment, whether they be the chief executive of the polity, or
the local school board, or director of corrections, that are more
perfectly tied to majoritarian politics than are the courts. Car-
olene Products and the theory of legislative failure thus have
important implications for structural reform; they provide a
basis, invoked with increasing frequency these days, for criti-
cizing the strong judicial role implicit in that mode of adju-
dication.
Structural reform arose in a context that did not test the
limits of the theory of legislative failure. The early school
desegregation cases, concentrated as they were in the South,
could be conceptualized as a compounded type of legislative
19 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a new
and highly suggestive commentary on the footnote, see R. Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities (r979) (unpublished manuscript on
file at the Yale Law School Library and the Harvard Law Review).
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failure'. The normal presumption in favor of majoritarianism
clearly did not control. The group being victimized was a
discrete and insular minority, indeed it was the paradigmatic
discrete and insular minority; the group was also denied formal
participation in the majoritarian process - at the time of
Brown, blacks were disenfranchised. It should be recognized,
however, as a first attempt to assess the theory of legislative
failure, and to understand its implications, that the politics of
race are different today, and, as a consequence, Carolene Prod-
ucts and its commitment to majoritarianism pose significant
challenges to structural reform even when it seeks to secure
the value of racial equality.
The disenfranchisement of blacks has been brought to an
end. In some communities throughout the nation, particularly
the large cities, blacks represent a sizeable portion of the elec-
torate. On a national level blacks represent a numerical mi-
nority, but that circumstance alone would not entitle us to
assume the legislative process has failed. The footnote does not
entitle any group to have a voice that exceeds its numbers -
quite the contrary. Account must also be taken of the fact
that blacks are now in a position to form coalitions. They are
no longer insular, and their discreteness, their cohesiveness,
may in fact give them a certain edge in forming coalitions,
especially compared with other groups of their size. True,
poverty, or more precisely the absence of large concentrations
of wealth in the black community, stands as a barrier to
effective political participation of that group. But poverty was
not identified by footnote four as a category of legislative
failure, and for good reason. The absence of wealth is so
pervasive a handicap, it is experienced by so many groups in
society, even the majority itself, that to recognize it as a
category of legislative failure would stand the theory of the
Carolene Products footnote on its head - it would undermine
the premise of majoritarianism itself.
I might also add that it seems increasingly important, es-
pecially as we look to the i98o's, for structural reform to move
beyond the bounds of racial justice; and in these new domains
the usefulness of footnote four in explaining and justifying the
judicial role is also unclear. Structural reform aimed at total
institutions - prisons and mental hospitals - may be under-
stood in terms of legislative failure, or more aptly, legislative
neglect. These institutions are intended to remove people from
the body politic 20 and judicial intervention might be seen as
the catalyst of majoritarianism rather than its enemy. Simi-
2 0 
See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
3-124 (ig6i).
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larly, a few of the other state bureaucracies - the public
housing authority, the welfare department - might be seen
as posing threats to distinct subgroups that are politically pow-
erless. But when the focus shifts, as I believe it must, to the
broad-based bureaucracies that typify the modern state - the
police, the state university, the taxing authorities, the health
maintenance organizations, the state owned industries, and so
forth - the theory of footnote four is of little use. The victim
of these organizations is the citizenry itself.
With respect to these broad-based organizations, majori-
tarianism and judicial intervention might seem reconcilable on
the theory that bureaucratization causes unique distortions of
the legislative process; bureaucrats have special incentives
and means for insulating their practices from public scrutiny.
21
But such an approach would expand footnote four far beyond
its original scope, and, given the large role of these broad-
based state bureaucracies in our social life today, it would
undermine the premise of legislative supremacy itself. The
commitment to majoritarianism would be a sham. Alterna-
tively, the emphasis may be on egalitarian values, and the
threat posed to those values by these broad-based organiza-
tions; but it seems to me that the relevant subgroup invoking
the claim of equality against these organizations - women,
the aged, or the lower and middle classes - is not likely to
be one that is disadvantaged in terms of majoritarian poli-
tics. Footnote four can be twisted and turned, and ex-
panded, 22 to accommodate these groups and their claims, but
only at a price: incoherence. Such an accommodation would
require us virtually to assume that whichever group happens
to lose the political struggle or fails to command the attention
of the legislature or executive is - by that fact alone - a
discrete and insular minority.
It is not just a question of usefulness - it now seems
clearer than ever that footnote four and the theory of legislative
failure that it announces is radically incomplete. The incom-
pleteness derives from two sources. First, the footnote gives
21 See generally W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT (1971); Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617 (x975);
Margolis, Comment, iB J.L. & ECON. 645 (1975); see also G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF
DECISION (1971).
22 Professor Ely's we-they theory was intended to explain the asymmetry of the
theory of legislative failure in the racial area and why strict scrutiny is appropriate
for measures to help blacks but not for those that hurt them; but it may have
applicability beyond that sphere. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CI. L. REv. 723 (1974). For my critique of the theory, see
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976),
reprinted in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel &
T. Scanlon eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Groups].
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no account of the judicial function even in the acknowledged
cases of legislative failure. It never explains why legislative
failure is to be corrected by judicial action. Second, the foot-
note never justifies its major normative premise, the one pos-
iting the supremacy of the majoritarian branches even when
constitutional values are at stake. At the root of both failings
is, I believe, a denial of the special character of our constitu-
tional values.
The theory of legislative failure identifies occasions for a
strong independent use of judicial power, but it does not pre-
scribe what should be done with that power. If there is an
abridgement of the right to vote, the judicial function may be
clear enough: restore the vote. Majoritarianism is thereby
perfected. But there is no simple way of understanding the
judicial function when failure arises from other causes, say,
from the fact that a discrete and insular minority is being
victimized. In such a situation the legislative decision may
not be entitled to any presumption of correctness, at least as
it affects that group, but the task still remains of determining,
as an affirmative matter, what the group is entitled to, either
by way of process rights or substantive rights. 23 Even if the
legislative resolution is not entitled to a presumption of cor-
rectness, there is no reason for assuming that the opposite
resolution would prevail if the legislative process were working
perfectly; there is no reason for assuming that the discrete and
insular group would win rather than lose. Nor would it make
much sense in terms of the ideals of the craft to view the judge
as a representative of, or as a spokesman for, the otherwise
voiceless minority. The judge is not to speak for the minority
or otherwise amplify its voice. The task of the judge is to give
meaning to constitutional values, and he does that by working
with the constitutional text, history, and social ideals. He
searches for what is true, right, or just.24 He does not become
a participant in interest group politics.
The function of a judge is to give concrete meaning and
application to our constitutional values. Once we perceive this
to be the judicial function in cases of admitted legislative
failure, then we are led to wonder why the performance of
this function is conditioned upon legislative failure in the first
place. What is the connection between constitutional values
and legislative failure? If the legislative process promised to
get us closer to the meaning of our constitutional values, then
the theory of legislative failure would be responsive to this
23 Groups, supra note 22, at 131. See also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Mi-
norities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1184 (1977).
24 See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAw, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 58 (P.
Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977); R. DWoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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puzzlement. But just the opposite seems true. Legislatures
are entirely of a different order. They are not ideologically
committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning
of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function
in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the
people - what they want and what they believe should be
done. Indeed, the preferred status of legislatures under foot-
note four is largely derived from this conception of their func-
tion. The theory of legislative failure, much like the theory of
market failure, 25 ultimately rests on a view that declares su-
preme the people's preferences.
How might such a view be reconciled with the very idea
of a Constitution? There is, to be certain, another part of
footnote four, one that I have not yet described. It concerns
not legislative failure, but textual specificity - highly specific
prohibitions of the Constitution. The free speech clause is the
example. 26 Footnote four is prepared to recognize these pro-
visions as a limitation on legislative supremacy; they stand as
a qualification of the view that postulates the supremacy of
the people's preferences. It is assumed that these prohibitions
are small in number. The more important point to note,
however, is that with respect to these textually-specific prohi-
bitions, footnote four does not condition judicial intervention
upon legislative failure, but instead looks to the courts as the
primary interpretative agency. Here the judicial function is to
"apply" these provisions, or to put the same point somewhat
differently, the judicial function is to give the values implicit
in these provisions their operative meaning.
This view of the judicial role in the domain of the textually-
specific, plus an understanding of the judicial function in cases
of legislative failure, is sufficient to call into question the theory
25 At one point, the theory of market failure, much like the theory of legislative
failure, was monolithic in its prescription in cases of failure (market failure inexorably
led to government regulation), though today it has a broader, more pluralistic vi-
sion. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MIARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975); Coase, Discussion,
54 AM. ECON. REV. 194 (I964) (Papers & Proceedings); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. i (196o). I am grateful to Judith Lachman for first drawing
attention to the parallelism in the intellectual structures of the theories of market and
legislative failure.
26 The example is inferred from the citations, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (I93I), and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), two early Hughes
Court decisions heralding a new era for free speech. In discussing the theory of
specificity the footnote speaks of the entire Bill of-Rights, giving us a further insight
into what that Court actually meant by textual specificity. The entire discussion of
this branch of Carotene Products reads: "There may be narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth." 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Then followed the citation to Stromberg and Lovell.
[Vol. 93:1
HeinOnline -- 93 Harv. L. Rev.  10 1979-1980
THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
of legislative failure itself. They imply a view of the judicial
function that is not easily cabined. They suggest that in fact
courts are not default institutions, that their rightful place does
not turn on the failure of another institution, whether it be the
legislature or the executive. They suggest that courts be seen
as a coordinate source of government power with their own
sphere of influence, one that is defined in terms that unify both
the occasion and function of the exercise of power. The ju-
dicial role is limited by the existence of constitutional values,
and the function of courts is to give meaning to those values.
The values that lie at the heart of most structural litigation
today - equality, due process, liberty, security of the person,
no cruel and unusual punishment - are not embodied in
textually-specific prohibitions; the equal protection clause -
no state shall deny any person equal protection of the laws -
is as specific as the free speech clause - Congress shall
pass no law abridging the freedom of speech - but neither is
very specific. They simply contain public values that must be
given concrete meaning and harmonized with the general.
structure of the Constitution. The same is probably true of
all the other provisions of the Constitution (e.g., the commerce
clause) that have been central to constitutional litigation for
almost two centuries. The absence of textual specificity does
not make the values any less real, nor any less important. The
values embodied in such non-textually-specific prohibitions as
the equal protection and due process clauses are central to our
constitutional order. They give our society an identity and
inner coherence - its distinctive public morality. The absence
of a textually-specific prohibition -does not deny the importance
of these values, but only makes the meaning-giving enterprise
more arduous: less reliance can be placed on text.
Of course, the further one moves from text, the greater the
risk of abuse; it is easier for judges, even unwittingly, to enact
into law their own preferences in the name of having discov-
ered the true meaning, say, of equality or liberty. It was just
this risk, elaborated by the Legal Realists, that haunted the
Progressives, and that helped sell the theory of legislative fail-
ure as the principle governing the interpretation of those values
not embodied in textually-specific prohibitions - better the
preferences of the people than the preferences of the
judges. 27 But the Progressives never explained why one set of
27 In the case of the textually-specific prohibitions, it would seem that the pref-
erences of the Framers, rather than that of the people or judges, would control. The
authors of Carolene Products seemed prepared to respect the preferences of that
particular social group, and yet some Progressives appeared intent on discrediting
those preferences, see, e.g., C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (I913).
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preferences was a more appropriate basis for a constitutional
judgment than the other; both seem inappropriate. Nor did
they explain why the risk of abuse, any more than the risk of
mistake, was itself a sufficient basis for denying the intelligi-
bility of the meaning-giving enterprise altogether. The judges
of Brown may have, as the critics of the Right and Left keep
reminding us, enacted into law their own preferences, pecul-
iarly reflecting their privileged social position; but it is also
possible, indeed, I would say, it is eminently probable, that
these judges had given a true account of the constitutional
value of equality. The judges involved in contemporary prison
litigation may have enacted into law their own preferences,
peculiarly reflecting their social background, their squeamish-
ness, when they proscribed the use of torture in all its varieties
- the teeterboard, the Tucker telephone, the strap, the failure
to provide medical care, the heavy use of armed, mounted, and
undisciplined trusties to supervise field labor, and the housing
of anywhere from 85 to 150 inmates in a single dormitory
room, leaving the weak and attractive to spend each night
terrorized by the "creepers" and "crawlers"; 28 but it is also
possible, indeed, I would say eminently probable, that these
judges had given a true account of the constitutional ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.
This conception of the judicial function, which sees the
judge as trying to give meaning to our constitutional values,
expects a lot from judges - maybe too much. The expectation
is not founded on a belief in their moral expertise, or on a
denial of their humanity. Judges are most assuredly people.
They are lawyers, but in terms of personal characteristics they
are no different from successful businessmen or politicians.
Their capacity to make a special contribution to our social life
derives not from any personal traits or knowledge, but from
the definition of the office in which they find themselves and
through which they exercise power. That office is structured
by both ideological and institutional factors that enable and
perhaps even force the judge to be objective - not to express
28 These examples are all taken from a single, but protracted case involving the
Arkansas prison system, recently sustained in some particulars by the Supreme Court
in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Ark. 2965); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. x967), vacated,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d xx85 (8th Cir. x969);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. I969); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aftd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp.
194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part and reversed in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas
Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d i94 (8th Cir. 1974); Finney v. Hutto, 42o F. Supp. 252
(E.D. Ark. 2976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1977). See also B. JACKSON, KILLING
TIME (i977); M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION (1976).
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his preferences or personal beliefs, or those of the citizenry, as
to what is right or just, but constantly to strive for the true
meaning of the constitutional value. 29 Two aspects of the
judicial office give it this special cast: one is the judge's obli-
gation to participate in a dialogue, and the second is his in-
dependence.
The judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has
participated in a dialogue about the meaning of the public
values. It is a dialogue with very special qualities: (a) Judges
are not in control of their agenda, but are compelled to con-
front grievances or claims they would otherwise prefer to ig-
nore. (b) Judges do not have full control over whom they
must listen to. They are bound by rules requiring them to
listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen. (c) Judges
are compelled to speak back, to respond to the grievance or
the claim, and to assume individual responsibility for that
response. (d) Judges must also justify their decisions.
The obligation to justify a decision has given rise to never-
ending debates as to the proper sources of judicial decisions -
text, intentions of the Framers, general structure of the
Constitution, ethics, the good of the nation, etc. 30  For the
notion of justification, as opposed to explanation, implies that
the reasons supporting a decision be "good" reasons, and this
in turn requires norms or rules for determining what counts
as a "good" reason. My intention is not to participate in the
debate about the rules for justification, but to stress two facts
that all seem to agree on as to what might count as a "good"
reason. The first is that the reason cannot consist of a pref-.
erence, be it a preference of the contestants, of the body politic,
or of the judge. The statement "I prefer" or "we prefer" in
the context of a judicial, rather than a legislative decision,
merely constitutes an explanation, not a justification. 31 Sec-
ond, the reason must somehow transcend the personal, tran-
sient beliefs of the judge or the body politic as to what is right
or just or what should be done. Something more is required
to transform these personal beliefs into values that are worthy
of the status "constitutional" and all that it implies - binding
on society as a whole, entitled to endure, not forever but long
29 In understanding the role of the objective perspective in adjudication I have
been particularly helped by two essays of Thomas Nagel dealing with objectivity in
ethics: Subjective and Objective, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 196 (1979); and The Limits
of Objectivity (1979) (Tanner Lecture at Oxford University) (on file at the Harvard
Law Review).
30 See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (I973).
31 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
Rxv. i.(g5g).
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enough to give our public morality an inner coherence, and
largely to be enforced by courts.
The judge is required to listen and to speak, and to speak
in certain ways. He is also required to be independent. This
means, for one thing, that he not identify with or in any way
be connected to the particular contestants. He must be im-
partial, distant, and detached from the contestants, thereby
increasing the likelihood that his decision will not be an expres-
sion of the self-interest (or preferences) of the contestants,
which is the antithesis of the right or just decision. The norm
of impartiality also requires that the judge be independent
from politics, in this instance understood as the process of
expressing the preferences of the people. The judge must not
view his job as one of registering those preferences. Inde-
pendence is clearly the norm in the federal system with its
promise of life tenure, but is present also in those state systems
in which judges are elected. The judge might be vulnerable
to the body politic when he stands for election, but that does
not determine how he should define his job, or how the body
politic should use its power.
The task of a judge, then, should be seen as giving meaning
to our public values and adjudication as the process through
which that meaning is revealed or elaborated. The question
still remains of determining the relationship between the courts
and the other agencies of government, for structural reform
places the courts in the position of issuing directives to other
agencies of government. The judiciary's essential function is
to give meaning to our constitutional values, but many of these
other agencies can perform that function in addition to that
of registering the preferences of the people. The legislature or
the school board or the warden of a prison is entitled to express
the preferences of the citizenry, a function not entrusted to the
courts, but these agencies can also strive to give meaning to
equality, or to work out the complicated relationship between
liberty and equality, or to decide whether the punishment
meted out is cruel and unusual. The existing practices in and
of themselves cannot be taken as a reflection of the considered
judgment of another branch of government on the meaning of
a constitutional value, particularly since we are dealing with
bureaucracies, in which policy is often determined by internal
power plays and default. 32 On the other hand, there can be
genuine conflicts. Situations - school desegregation is prob-
ably a good example - will arise where the courts and other
agencies of government will come to the opposite conclusion
37 M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 187-98 (x964).
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as to the meaning of a constitutional value, and the need will
arise to work out the relationship between the branches.
To simply postulate the supremacy of the more majoritar-
ian branches, the legislative or the executive, as the promoters
of footnote four do, 33 is no answer, for, as we saw, the people's
preferences are not the standard, and there is no discernible
connection between majoritarianism and the meaning of a
constitutional value. Courts may have their difficulties in giv-
ing a constitutional value its correct meaning, but so would
the other branches. History is as filled with legislative and
executive mistakes as it is filled with judicial ones. Admit-
tedly, adjudication will have its class and professional biases,
because so much power is entrusted to lawyers, but the leg-
islative and executive processes will have their own biases -
wealth, dynasty, charisma. It is not clear which set of biases
will cause the greatest departure from the truth.
One may be tempted to invoke the democratic ideal to
resolve this conflict, and yet it is far from dispositive. There
are many places at which the people bind the adjudicatory
process, even in the federal system; they elect the officers who
appoint the judges, they can pass statutes controlling proce-
dural matters, and they even have the power to overrule a
constitutional judgment by amending the Constitution. Of
course, it is hard to amend the Constitution, harder than it is
to revise the work of common law judges through the passage
of statutes, but democracy is not a fixed rule that always
prefers a simple majority, as opposed to a special majority,
any more than it deifies the subjective preference. Democracy,
as an ideal of our constitutional system, allows a role for both
subjective preference and public value, and the special major-
ity requirement of the amendment process may well be seen
as a way of preserving the delicate balance between those two
domains in our political life.
I suspect that the relationship between the branches in the
constitutional domain - in giving meaning to the non-tex-
tually-specific values, as well as others - is a more pluralistic
or dialectical relationship than footnote four permits: all can
strive to give meaning to constitutional values .34 The theory
of structural reform, no more than any other form of consti-
33 Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5 (1978); Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode
of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REv. 451 (1978).
34 The concept of dialogue lies at the heart of the work of two of my colleagues.
See R. BURT, TAMING CARE OF STRANGERS (1979); B. Ackerman, Social Justice in
the Liberal State (1979) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Yale Law School
Library and the Harvard Law Review).
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tutional litigation, does not require that courts have the only
word or even the last word, but that they be allowed to speak
and to do so with some authority. Process is the measure of
that authority. The right of the judge to speak, and the
obligation of others to listen, depends not on the judge's per-
sonal attributes, nor even on the content of his message, but
on the quality of his process - on his ability to be distant and
detached from the immediate contestants and from the body
politic, yet fully attentive to grievances, and responsive in
terms that transcend preferences and that are sufficient to
support a judgment deemed "constitutional." There may be
other processes or methods for giving meaning to constitutional
values, though what they might be is not clear to me, but the
process I have just described - the core of adjudication -
is the only one open to the judge. This process is a limitation
on his legitimacy, and even more importantly, it has a close
conceptual connection - not just a contingent or instrumental
one - to the very act of giving meaning to a constitutional
value. We impute function largely on the basis of process and
at the same time function shapes process. Others may search
for the true meaning of our constitutional values, but when
they do, they will have to mimic - if they can - the process
of the judge.
In the i96o's, the courts played a central role in our social
life because they saw that the ideal of equality was inconsistent
with the caste system implied by Jim Crow laws. In the
decade that followed, they struggled to give meaning to a
broader range of constitutional values, and perceived the
threat to those values in a wide variety of contexts - the
barbarisms of total institutions, the abuses of the police, the
indignities of welfare systems. Today we have doubts about
the role of courts and, just as we are rediscovering the market,
we are quickly resurrecting footnote four and the claim of
legislative supremacy. This development cannot be wholly
explained in terms of increasing doubts as to the competency
of courts; for without a belief in the conceptual connection
between function and process, without a belief in the capacity
of courts to give meaning to our constitutional values, even
the subscribers to Carolene Products are at a loss to explain
the judicial function in cases of legislative failure or why the
void left by legislative failure should be filled by the courts.
In my judgment, the resurgence of Carolene Products does not
stem from doubts about the special capacity of courts and their
processes to move us closer to a correct understanding of our
constitutional values, but from the frail quality of our sub-
stantive vision. We have lost our confidence in the existence
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of the values that underlie the litigation of the i96o's, or, for
that matter, in the existence of any public values. All is
preference. That seems to be the crucial issue, not the issue
of relative institutional competence. Only once we reassert our
belief in the existence of public values, that values such as
equality, liberty, due process, no cruel and unusual punish-
ment, security of the person, or free speech can have a trub
and important meaning, that must be articulated and imple-
mented - yes, discovered - will the role of the courts in our
political system become meaningful, or for that matter even
intelligible.
II. FORM AND FUNCTION
At the core of structural reform is the judge, and his effort
to give meaning to our public values. This allocation of power
raises questions of legitimacy common to all types of adjudi-
cation, but the structural mode raises new and distinct issues
of legitimacy as well. These issues arise from the organiza-
tional setting of the structural suit, from the fact that the judge
is responding to a threat posed to our constitutional values by
a large-scale organization. He seeks to remove the threat by
restructuring the organization, and that ambition has impor-
tant implications for theform of the lawsuit.
The structural mode is most often attacked on the ground
that it involves a departure from some ideal form. This crit-
icism obviously presupposes a prototypical or "model" lawsuit,
an ideal form, against which all lawsuits will be measured.
The usual standard of comparison, the dispute-resolution
model, is triadic and highly individualistic: a lawsuit is visu-
alized - with the help of the icon of justice holding the scales
of justice - as a conflict between two individuals, one called
plaintiff and the other defendant, with a third standing be-
tween the two parties, as a passive umpire, to observe and
decide who is right, who is wrong, and to declare that the
right be done. From this perspective, structural reform surely
is a transformation; it looks breathtakingly different.35 It is
important, though, to be clear about the specific terms of the
formal transformation before wondering whether the dispute-
resolution model can properly be considered an ideal.
3s Two of the most spectacular instances of the transformation are Judge Henley's
decade-long struggle with the Arkansas prison system, see note 28 supra, and Judge
Weinstein's attempt to reorganize the Mark Twain School in Coney Island, see Hart
v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (remedial order), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Fishman,
The Limits of Remedial Power: Hart v. Community School Board 21, in LIMITS OF
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A. The Transformation
i. The Focus of the Suit: Incident of Wrongdoing v. Social
Condition. - The dispute-resolution model presupposes a so-
cial world that is essentially harmonious. A set of norms
confers rights and duties upon individuals. Individuals make
arrangements within those norms, but sometimes incidents oc-
cur that disturb the harmony; for example, the farmer may
not honor his promise to sell the cow. The aggrieved individ-
ual then turns to the courts, either to implement or enforce
one of the norms, or, possibly, to fill out the meaning of the
norm. The focus of the evidentiary inquiry will be the inci-
dent, or in the language of pleading rules, the "transaction" or
"occurrence." 36
In contrast, the focus of structural reform is not upon
particular incidents or transactions, but rather upon the con-
ditions of social life and the role that large-scale organizations
play in determining those conditions. What is critical is not
the black child turned away at the door of the white school,
or the individual act of police brutality. These incidents may
have triggered the lawsuit. They" may also be of evidentiary
significance: evidence of a "pattern or practice" 37 of racism or
lawlessness. But the ultimate subject matter of the lawsuit or
focus of the judicial inquiry is not these incidents, these par-
ticularized and discrete events, but rather a social condition
that threatens important constitutional values and the organi-
zational dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition.
2. Party Structure: The Plaintiff. - The concept of a
plaintiff consists of three distinct analytic components: (a) vic-
tim; (b) spokesman; and (c) beneficiary. The individual who
claims that a contract has been breached is the victim of the
JUSTICE ii5 (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds. 1978); Berger, Away from the Court
House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707
(1978); Rosenbaum & Presser, Voluntary Racial Integration in a Magnet School, 86
SCH. REV. 156 (1978); Oelsner, New York's Best Public Schools Defy Racial Stereo-
typing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1978, at Bi, col. I. For a theoretical analysis of the
case, see R. Katzmann, Judicial Intervention: Changing the Processes and Policies of
Public Bureaucracies (1979) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Yale Law School
Library and the Harvard Law Review).
36 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1290 (1976).
37 The "pattern or practice" concept plays a pervasive role in structural litiga-
tion. Sometimes it is used as an evidentiary requirement, as a necessary predicate for
structural relief (only a series of acts that amount to a "pattern or practice" will justify
so thoroughgoing relief); sometimes it is used as a technique for marshalling the
resources of the Executive Branch (the Department of Justice should sue only when
there is a "pattern or practice" of discrimination); sometimes it is even used as a basis
for inferring intent. See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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wrongdoing. He is also the one to gain, primarily, or maybe
even exclusively, from the action of the court. And there is
every reason to assume he is a highly competent spokesman,
in the same sense that there is every reason to assume that an
individual is the best judge of his self-interest. The ethic of
the market is transferred to the courtroom. In structural re-
form, the unity implicit in the concept of party disintegrates,
the components become separate, and the exclusively indivi-
dualistic perspective shifts to one that includes social groups
and institutional advocates.
The victim of a structural suit is not an individual, but a
group. In some instances the group is defined in terms of an
institution: the inmates of the prison or welfare recipients. Or
the victim may consist of a group that has an identity beyond
the institution: in a school desegregation case, for example, the
victims are not the pupils, but probably a larger social group,
blacks. 38 In either instance, it is important to stress two fea-
tures of the group. First, it exists independently of the lawsuit;
it is not simply a legal construct. Wholly apart from the
lawsuit, individuals can define themselves in terms of their
membership in the group, and that group can have its own
internal politics, struggles for power, and conflicts. 3 9 Sec-
ondly, the group is not simply an aggregation or collection of
identifiable individuals. We understand the plight of the in-
mates of an institution subjected to inhuman conditions with-
out knowing, or, in the case of future inmates, without even
being able to know, who they are in any particularized
sense. The group exists, has an identity, and can be harmed,
even though all the individuals are not yet in being and not
every single member is threatened by the organization.
Once we take the group perspective on the victim, it also
becomes clear that the spokesman need not - indeed can-
not - be the victim. A group needs people to speak on its
behalf. An individual member of the victim group can be a
spokesman, but there is no reason why individual membership
should be required, or for that matter even preferred. An
individual must be a minor hero to stand up and challenge the
status quo: imagine the courage and fortitude required to be
the spokesman in a school desegregation suit, or even worse,
38 See generally Groups, supra note 22; see also Note, Antidiscrimination Class
Actions Under the Federal Rules: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J.
868 (x979).
39 See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); cf. Yeazell, Group Litigation and
Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 CoLuM. L. REV. 866 (1977)
(describing the origins of class action suits in terms of more cohesive social groups).
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one challenging the administration of a total institution, such
as a prison. Individuals are in such a vulnerable position, so
much at risk, that it is a cruelty to insist, as some of the
Justices have done on occasion, 40 that the spokesman be the
individual member of the group, for example, brutalized by
the prison guards. Institutional advocates, some governmental
(the Department of Justice), others private (the NAACP or the
ACLU), are often needed to play a key role as spokesmen for
the victim group. 4 1 Such spokesmen may even be preferred.
They may introduce their own biases, but on the whole they
are likely to present a fuller picture of the law or facts than
would the individual victim.
The relation between the victim and the spokesman in the
structural context is entirely instrumental; it is not a relation-
ship of identity. As an affirmative matter this means that the
court must determine whether the interests of the victim group
are adequately represented. This inquiry is not without par-
allel in the dispute-resolution context, though there individuals
rather than groups or interests are being represented. In either
context, it is an extremely difficult inquiry. At the same time,
the instrumental character of the relationship between spokes-
man and victim group, the separation of the two, means that
certain technical qualifications for the victim - that he be
subject to a risk of future harm, 42 or that he be subject to
irreparable injury43 - need not be satisfied by the spokes-
man. For the structural suit it is sufficient if these require-
ments are satisfied by the victim group. What the court must
ask of the spokesman is whether he is an adequate represen-
tative, and, as difficult a question as that may be, technical
40 See, e.g., Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (976).
41 See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'" REV. 95 (974); Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972).
42 A contrary attitude was expressed by the Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976), see note 13 supra. On the other hand, in considering related
problems of mootness,'the Burger Court has been more equivocal. Compare Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (976) (a statutorily-based employment
discrimination case); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 2O3, i1o n.ix (1975); and Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975), with Kremens v. Bartley, 432 U.S. 119 (1977),
and Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). Equally confusing has
been the attempt to square the traditional standing requirements with the dictates of
the structural suit. Compare, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), with Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). On the
topic of standing, and more generally on the relations between public values and
adjudication, see the inspiring book by Joseph Vining, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978).
43 Once again the Burger Court has been highly divided on this issue. See Allee
v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (i974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (2974). I discuss
these cases in detail in Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1148-6o (1977).
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requirements such as irreparability or the risk of future harm
do not have any important bearing on that question. They do
not make the question any easier: they are neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions of adequacy.
The instrumental connection between spokesman and vic-
tim is also conducive to a view that tolerates, or even invites,
a multiplicity of spokesmen. In the dispute-resolution model,
where the victim is an individual, and that victim is identified
with the spokesman, the typical party structure is bipolar: a
single plaintiff vied against a single defendant. In a structural
lawsuit the typical pattern is to find a great number of spokes-
men, each perhaps representing different views as to what is
in the interest of the victim group. Moreover, it would be
wrong to assume that the relationship between all those on the
plaintiff side is equally antagonistic to all those on the defend-
ant's: the physical image of the antagonism is not binary, but
an array grouped around a single issue. One spokesman for
the victim group may want two-way busing; another, more
sensitive to "white flight" or more insistent on "quality edu-
cation," may want a magnet school; and, in fact, some of those
speaking for the defendants may also favor the magnet school
or some mild form of busing. 44 The multiplicity of spokesmen
does not create these differences. They exist in the real world,
and the court must hear from all before it can decide what
the ideal of racial equality requires.
Paralleling this separation between victim and spokesman,
the structural mode of litigation also contemplates a distinction
between the victim and the group who will benefit from the
remedy. In a suit for breach of contract, the remedy is aimed
at making the victim whole, whether the remedy be damages
or specific performance. In the structural context, however,
the victims and the beneficiaries need not be coextensive.
Though the beneficiary of structural relief is necessarily also
a group, it could have a different membership and a different
contour than the victim group. Consider, for example, a police
brutality case. 45 Let us assume that the concern is with lawless
conduct by the police directed at members of racial minorities
in the city. The court believes an internal disciplinary proce-
dure should be established within the police department to
lessen the threat to constitutional values. The court could
make that machinery available only to members of the victim
44 Conflicts of this nature were acutely present in the Coney Island case, Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (remedial order), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. i975), and also in the famed
Norwalk Core school litigation, Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F.
Supp. 203 (D. Conn. x968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
45 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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group, say blacks and Chicanos, but it need not. The court
may decide that such a limitation would be both inefficient
and counterproductive - indeed might even raise its own
problems of fairness and constitutionality (reverse discrimina-
tion) - and for that reason the court may extend the protection
of the decree to a much larger group - all the city.
46
The separability of victim and beneficiary derives in part
from the group nature of the victim since, at best, the limits
of that group can only be approximated. More fundamentally,
it derives from the instrumental nature of the remedy.47 The
whole judicial enterprise, as is true of any exercise of govern-
mental power, is constrained by considerations of efficacy and
fairness, and, in the context of structural reform, these factors
may lead the court to structure the beneficiary class so that it
is not coextensive with the victim group. There is no reason
why the shape of the benefited class is to be determined by
one factor and one factor alone, namely, a guess as to the
approximate shape of the victim group.
3. Party Structure: The Defendant. - As might be imag-
ined, the disaggregation of roles that I have just discussed on
the plaintiff's side is repeated on the defendant's. The de-
fendant envisioned in the dispute-resolution model is expected
to perform three different functions: (a) spokesman; (b) wrong-
doer; and (c) addressee (or the person who must provide the
remedy). The dispute-resolution model assumes that all three
functions are unified, or put another way, combined in the
same individual, for example, the farmer who refuses to per-
form his contract. In the structural context, the functions are
separated, and even more significantly, one function, that of
the wrongdoer, virtually disappears.
The concept of wrongdoer is highly individualistic. It pre-
supposes personal qualities: the capacity to have an intention
and to choose. Paradigmatically, a wrongdoer is one who
intentionally inflicts harm in violation of an established
norm. In the structural context, there may be individual
wrongdoers, the police officer who hits the citizen, the prin-
cipal who turns away the black child at the schoolhouse door,
the prison guard who abuses the inmate; they are not, how-
ever, the target of the suit. The focus is on a social condition,
not incidents of wrongdoing, and also on the bureaucratic
dynamics that produce that condition. In a sense, a structural
suit is an in rem proceeding where the res is the state bureauc-
"6 Having reached that conclusion, the Court may now redefine the victim group
so that it is coextensive with the beneficiary - the victim of police brutality is all the
people of the city, not just the racial minority - but that post hoc redefinition does
not seem useful or necessary.
47See pp. 47-50 infra.
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racy.48 The costs and burdens of reformation are placed on
the organization, not because it has "done wrong," in either
a literal or metaphorical sense, for it has neither an intention
nor a will, 4 9 but because reform is needed to remove a threat
to constitutional values posed by the operation of the organi-
zation.
From the perspective of certain remedies, such as damage
judgments and criminal sanctions, this conclusion may seem
startling. Those remedies are retrospective in the sense that
a necessary condition for each is a past wrong; they require
some evaluative judgment as to the wrongfulness of the de-
fendant's conduct in terms of preexisting norms. But the rem-
edy at issue in a structural case is the injunction, and it does
not require a judgment about wrongdoing, future or past. The
structural suit seeks to eradicate an ongoing threat to our
constitutional values and the injunction can serve as the formal
mechanism by which the court issues directives as to how that
is to be accomplished. It speaks to the future. The prospective
quality of the injunction, plus the fact that it fuses power in
the judge, explains the preeminence of the injunction in struc-
tural reform.5 0 Only at later stages of structural reform, after
many cycles of supplemental relief, when the directives have
48 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971) ("This case, unlike earlier cases . . . which have involved specific
practices and abuses alleged to have been practiced upon Arkansas convicts, amounts
to an attack on the System itself."); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 69i (E.D.
Ark. 1965) ("The Court does not think that it should bring this opinion to a close
without stating that nothing said herein should be construed as a claim that the
respondent personally is an evil, brutal, or cruel man or that he personally approves
of all long standing practices of the penitentiary system.").
49 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), makes the intent to segregate a
necessary condition of an equal protection violation, and as such might be regarded
as another assault - this time in the substantive domain - on the idea of structural
reform. The Court did not come to grips with the theoretical problems created by
the use of the concept of "intent" in an organizational setting, such as the problem of
aggregation (whose intent shall count as the intent of the organization?), nor has the
Court even defined what intent should mean in such a context. These issues are
explored in my address before the Second Circuit Judicial Conference in September
1976, on the inappropriateness of the intent test in equal protection cases, Equality
in Education, 74 F.R.D. 276, 278 (I977), and in Seth Kreimer's brilliant Note,
Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De FactolDe Jure
Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
50 See generally 0. FISS, THE CIIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Other factors,
such as the insensitivity of state bureaucracies to market incentives and the decen-
tralized system of initiation, might also help explain the preeminence of the injunction
in structural reform. It should be noted that some other remedies (e.g., declaratory
judgments, conditional habeas corpus) have many of the same qualities as the in-
junction, for example, its prospectivity, and could be expected to be found in structural
suits. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. i86i, 1867 n.6 (1979) (saving the question
whether conditional habeas could be used as the injunction in altering the conditions
of pretrial detention).
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become very specific, do criminal sanctions or even damage
judgments become available (in an independent proceeding or
as part of the contempt process).51 Then the wrongdoing
largely consists of disobedience of judicial orders.
In the course of the reconstructive process, the judge must
ultimately penetrate the institutional facade, take the lid off
the so-called black box, in order to locate critical operatives
within the institution to whom the reconstructive directives
must be issued. These directives seem addressed to individu-
als, often to avoid eleventh amendment problems, 52 but in
truth they are addressed to bureaucratic offices, not to the
persons who happen to occupy those offices at any single point
of time. 53 These directives are not predicated on the view that
the present or even the prior occupants of the office are guilty
of wrongdoing, in the individualistic sense, but rather that the
judicially prescribed action - with all its attendant burdens,
financial and other - is necessary to eliminate the threat that
the institution as a whole poses to constitutional values. 54
4. The Posture of the Judge. - The dispute-resolution
model envisions a passive role for the judge. He is to stand
as umpire or observer between the two disputants, relying on
all their initiatives for the presentation of the facts and the law
and the articulation of the possible remedies. The judge's task
is simply to declare which one is right. The appropriateness
of such a passive pose is questioned by many factors not the
least of which is inequalities in the distribution of resources,
whether it be wealth or talent. These inequalities give the
judge every reason to assume a more active role in the litiga-
tion, to make certain that he is fully informed and that a just
result will be reached, not one determined by the distribution
of resources in the natural lottery or in the market. These
concerns are present in structural litigation, and indeed may
intensify when the organization has a clientele that predomi-
nantly comes from the lower economic classes, as is true with
51 For an attempt to address the problems of harmonizing the criminal law with
bureaucratic reality, see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate
Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
s2 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, i59-6o (r9o8). At one point, the person-
alization of the defendant may have reflected a desire to avoid the special problems
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (i973), but
those needs have been removed, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
s3 Compare, e.g., Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974), with Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 2o5 n.9 (4th Cir. I966), and Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp.
79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd sub nom. McCorvey v. Lucy, 328 F.2d 892 (gth Cir. 2964)
(per curiam).
S4 See p. 49 infra.
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a prison or a welfare agency. But structural litigation intro-
duces other, quite distinct reasons for abandoriing a purely
passive judicial posture. They stem from the special character
of the parties. Exclusive reliance on their initiatives becomes
even more untenable.
As noted earlier, the named plaintiff and his lawyer speak
not just for themselves, but also for a group, for example, the
present and future users of the institution. There is no basis
for assuming they are adequate representatives of the group,
for they simply elect themselves to that position. Similarly,
there is no reason to assume that the named defendant and
his lawyer are adequate representatives of the organization's
interests. Here it is not a matter of self-election, but election
by an adversary.
The spokesmen for the state bureaucracy usually have a
formal connection to the organization; the superintendent of
schools may be appointed by a school board, which in turn is
duly elected; the warden of the prison may be appointed by
the Governor, and his lawyer, the Attorney General, may be
elected. The existence of these formal connections, however,
should not obscure the fact that the initial choice as to who
shall speak or represent the organization in this proceeding is
made by forces standing in an antagonistic relationship to it,
the named plaintiff and his lawyer, the adversaries. The risk
is ever present that they may choose an inappropriate officer,
or have a too narrow conception of the institutional framework
that accounts for the condition. The plaintiff, for example,
may see the segregated schools as the responsibility of the
school board alone, when in truth both housing and school
policies are implicated.55
The presence of an improper representative on either side
of the lawsuit may have consequences that far transcend the
interests of the participants. The court may be led into er-
ror. The named plaintiff may also wittingly or unwittingly
compromise the interests of the victim group in a way that
cannot easily be rectified in subsequent proceedings. The
defendant, it must also be remembered, speaks not just for
himself in any personalized sense, but for all occupants of the
office, past and future; all the other offices within the hierarchy
of the institution; and all those who stand outside the institu-
tion but who are nonetheless directly affected by any reorgani-
zation of the institution, including the taxpayers who finance
it and those who depend on the institution to provide some
vital service.
SS See Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699; supplemented, 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (remedial order), aft'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Starting from this perspective, it seems almost absurd to
rely exclusively on the initiatives of those persons or agencies
who happened to be named plaintiff and defendant. The
judge must assume some affirmative responsibility to assure
adequate representation, but what form might that action
take? It would seem foolish for the judge to assume a repre-
sentational role himself; indeed, it would compromise the very
ideal of impartiality, which is so important a predicate for
judicial legitimacy. The more appropriate response, and the
one typically employed in the structural context is for the judge
- often acting on his own - to construct a broader represen-
tational framework. This might be done in a number of ways
that are consistent with the commitment to impartiality.
First, a notice can be sent to many of those who are
purportedly represented in the litigation. The notice would
explain the litigation, and invite a contest to the fullness and
adequacy of the representation. Even here, it should be noted,
the judge cannot rely exclusively on the named parties to insist
on notice or to formulate its content. On the one hand, ex-
tensive notice requirements might compound the adversary's
costs of continuing the litigation, 56 while on the other hand,
neither party has much of an incentive to make certain that
his adversary is the best representative. Second, the judge
may invite certain organizations or agencies to participate in
the lawsuit, as an amicus or as a party, or as a hybrid - the
litigating amicus. Of course, ever mindful of the conditions of
his legitimacy, the judge should not limit the invitation to
those who would say what he wants to hear, nor has that
been the practice. The concept of a litigating amicus first took
root in school cases where trial judges invited the United States
to participate; the intent was to obtain the Executive's com-
mitment to enforce the decree, and also to broaden the rep-
resentational structure. 57 More recently, this practice has been
transferred to the context of total institutions, prisons and
mental hospitals, where it is even more urgently required,
given the relative absence of private institutional advocates
and the distortion likely to flow from exclusive reliance on
complaints from individual victims. 5 8 Third, the trial courts
56 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
57 See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. x963);
0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 618-I9, 626-28 (1972); note 2 supra.
ss In a dissent from denial of certiorari, three Justices objected to the United States
having party status. Estelle v. Justice, 426 U.S. 925 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., with
whom Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., join, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (inter-
venor). See also United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1512 (4th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff). Bills have been introduced to remove any doubts about the authority of
the United States as a litigant. See H.R. 9400, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (x978) ("An Act
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have sometimes found it necessary, perhaps when they could
no longer rely on the Executive or private institutional advo-
cates, to create their own agencies, such as special masters, to
correct any representational inadequacies. The special master
is an institution with many roles, as we will see, but one of
them is representational. 59 He sometimes acts as a party,
presenting the viewpoints about liability and remedy not oth-
erwise likely to be expressed by the participants in the lawsuit.
5. The Remedial Phase. - The focus in the dispute-reso-
lution model is the incident, the transaction or occurrence, and
the remedial phase is largely episodic. The remedy is designed
to correct or prevent a discrete event, and the judicial function
usually exhausts itself when judgment is announced and the
amount of damages calculated or the decree aimed at some
discrete event is issued. Under these assumptions, the lawsuit
has, as Abram Chayes expressed it at a workshop at Yale this
past year, an Aristotelian's dramatic unity, a beginning, a
middle, and an end. In some cases involving a recalcitrant
defendant, there may be more to the remedial phase - for
example, seizure and sale of assets or a contempt pro-
ceeding. 60 But these struggles with the recalcitrant defend-
ant are the exception, and in any event they are not considered
an integral part of the first proceeding. They often involve a
collateral proceeding handled by different personnel, the sheriff
or a master, to enforce the remedy given in the initial pro-
ceeding.
The remedial phase in structural litigation is far from ep-
isodic. It has a beginning, maybe a middle, but no end -
well, almost no end. It involves a long, continuous relation-
ship between the judge and the institution; it is concerned not
with the enforcement of a remedy already given, but with the
giving or shaping of the remedy itself. The task is not to
declare who is right or who is wrong, not to calculate the
amount of damages or to formulate a decree designed to stop
some discrete act. The task is to remove the condition that
To Authorize Actions for Redress In Cases Involving Deprivations of Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Secured or Protected by the Constitution or Laws of the
United States"), reprinted in Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 5 th Cong., ist Sess. 286-88 (1977). See
also note 13 supra.
s9 See G. Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The Evo-
lution of Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation (1979)
(unpublished manuscript on file at the Yale Law School Library and the Harvard Law
Review) (excerpts are reprinted in R. COVER & 0. FIss, supra note i8, at 370).
6 0 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation (1979) (forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review).
31979]
HeinOnline -- 93 Harv. L. Rev.  27 1979-1980
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
threatens the constitutional values. In some instances, where
deinstitutionalization is conceivable, as in the mental health
field, closing the institution may be a viable option. 61 For the
most part, in cases involving schools, prisons, welfare agen-
cies, police departments, and housing authorities, for example,
that option is not available. Then the remedy involves the
court in nothing less than the reorganization of an ongoing
institution, so as to remove the threat it poses to constitutional
values. The court's jurisdiction will last as long as the threat
persists.
Limitations on our knowledge about organizational behav-
ior, coupled with the capacity of organizations to adapt to the
interventions by reestablishing preexisting power relationships,
invariably result in a series of interventions - cycle after cycle
of supplemental relief. A long term supervisory relationship
develops between the judge and the institution, for perform-
ance must be monitored, and new strategies devised for mak-
ing certain that the operation of the organization is kept within
constitutional bounds. 62 The judge may even create new agen-
cies - once again the special master - to assist in these
tasks. In doing so, he reflects either doubts about the capacity
of the existing parties to discharge these tasks or an awareness
of the magnitude of these tasks.
B. The Significance of the Transformation
Assume that the structural lawsuit has the formal features
I have just described and also that it can be sharply differ-
entiated from the dispute-resolution model in these particu-
lars. The two lawsuits do not look alike. Gone is the triad,
the icon of Justice holding two balances, and in its place a
whole series of metaphors are offered to describe the structural
suit. Some, emphasizing the distinctive party structure, speak
of town meetings, 63 others, emphasizing the posture of the
judge, speak of management or the creation of a new admin-
istrative agency. Of course, these metaphors decide nothing;
they merely express a feeling that something is different. The
question still remains as to the significance of the distinctive
61 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hasp., 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (appeal pending); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 975) (consent decree) (unpublished decree or-
dered a gradual phase-out of Willowbrook) (on file at the Yale Law School Library
and the Harvard Law Review).
62 0. Fiss, supra note 5o, at 31.
63 For a sympathetic use of the town meeting metaphor, using it as a predicate for
expanding the possibilities of intervention, see Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of
Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244
(1977).
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form of the structural suit. Differences do not provoke doubts
as to legitimacy unless a normative priority can be established
for the dispute-resolution model; and that seems to me pre-
cisely where the standard critique of structural reform fails.
The ultimate issue is whether dispute resolution, particu-
larly in the individualistic sense just described, has a prior or
exclusive claim on the concept of "adjudication"; I might be-
gin, however, by expressing my doubt as to whether it has
any claim - any significant claim - on the central adjudi-
catory institution, courts. I doubt whether dispute resolution
is an adequate description of the social function of courts. To
my mind courts exist to give meaning to our public values,
not to resolve disputes. Constitutional adjudication is the most
vivid manifestation of this function, but it also seems true of
most civil and criminal cases, certainly now and perhaps for
most of our history as well.
64
Most accounts of the judicial function begin with the same
story: two people in the state of nature are squabbling over a
piece of property, they come to an impasse, and, rather than
resorting to force, turn to a third party, a stranger, for a
decision. Courts are but an institutionalization of the
stranger. This story, much like the story of the social contract,
operates in the ill-defined land between the normative and
descriptive. It does not purport to be an accurate portrayal of
social history, of how courts actually came into being, but
nevertheless is supposed to capture or express the underlying
"social logic" of courts, even though no attempt is made to
reconcile this story with the underlying social reality.65 It
seems to me, however, that once full account is taken of the
role of courts in modern society, in ordinary criminal, consti-
tutional, and statutory cases (e.g., antitrust, environmental, or
securities law), and perhaps also in the traditional common
law cases, it becomes clear that the familiar story fundamen-
tally misleads. It does not capture the "social logic" of courts,
and might well be replaced by another story: the sovereign
sends out his officers throughout the realm to speak the law
and to see that it is obeyed.
Disputation has a pervasive role in litigation. Disputes
may arise as to the meaning of a public value or as to the
existence of a norm, and thus provide the occasions for judicial
intervention. Also, courts may rely on the antagonistic rela-
tionship between various individuals or agencies for the pres-
64 See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
6s Shapiro, Courts, in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 321-71 (F. Greenstein
& N. Polsby eds. 1975).
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entation of the law and facts. The judge hopes that the desire
of each to win provides a motivating force. Disputation can
thus be viewed as a mode of judicial operation. I will also
concede that the judge's decision may bring an end to the
dispute; dispute resolution may be one consequence of the
judicial decision. But as pervasive a role as disputation may
play in litigation, it is equally important to recognize that the
function of the judge - a statement of social purpose and a
definition of role - is not to resolve disputes, but to give the
proper meaning to our public values. Typically, he does this
by enforcing and thus safeguarding the integrity of the existing
public norms or by supplying new norms. These norms may
protect the fruits of one's bargains or labors; they may regulate
the use of automobiles or determine responsibility for compen-
sation; they may preserve the integrity of markets by curbing
fraud or monopolization; or they may impose limits on the use
of state power. In the structural suit, the judge reorganizes
the institution as a way'of discharging this very same function.
Of course, some disputes may not threaten or otherwise
implicate a public value. All the disputants may, for example,
acknowledge the norms and confine their dispute to the inter-
pretation of the words of the contract or the price of a
bumper. Such disputes may wind their way into court, and
judges may spend time on these purely private disputes -
private because only the interests and behavior of the imme-
diate parties to the dispute are at issue. That seems, however,
an extravagant use of public resources, and thus it seems quite
appropriate for those disputes to be handled not by courts, but
by arbitrators (though courts may have to act as background
institutions enforcing or maybe even creating obligations to
arbitrate). 66 Arbitration is like adjudication in that it too seeks
the right, the just, the true judgment. 67 There is, however,
an important difference in the two processes arising from the
nature of the decisional agency - one private, the other pub-
lic. Arbitrators are paid for by the parties; chosen by the
parties; and enjoined by a set of practices (such as a reluctance
to write opinions or generate precedents) that localizes or pri-
66 See Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
('979). When a court acts as a background institution, it is giving expression to the
public value favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, which is quite different from
resolving the dispute itself.
67 Mediation is also a dispute-resolution process, but distinguished from arbitration
or adjudication by its subjective quality: the correct result is defined as that which
the parties accept. See generally M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW io6-25 (1975);
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemak-
ing, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1976).
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vatizes the decision. 68 The function of the arbitrator is to
resolve a dispute. The function of the judge, on the other
hand, must be understood in wholly different terms: he is a
public officer; paid for by public funds; chosen not by the
parties but by the public or its representatives; and empowered
by the political agencies to enforce and create society-wide
norms, and perhaps even to restructure institutions, as a way,
I suggest, of giving meaning to our public values.
I may have overstated the position, and have drawn too
sharp a distinction between arbitration and adjudication. I
may have a too grandiose view of what people expect from
judges as opposed to arbitrators. But it must be remembered
that wholly apart from the question of whether dispute reso-
lution has any claim on judicial resources, the question still
remains whether it has a normatively prior claim on the office
of the judge. The ultimate issue is whether dispute resolution
is the ideal against which structural reform is to be judged.
How might that priority be established? Three different tacks
have been taken - one is instrumental, another is historical,
and the third is axiomatic.
The instrumental critique, most strongly suggested by
David Horowitz in a recent book, The Courts and Social
Policy,69 emphasizes the high risk of error in structural reform
as opposed to dispute resolution. The argument is that the
judge should be limited to doing what he does best - dispute
resolution. Under the instrumental critique, dispute resolution
becomes the ideal simply because it is what courts can do best.
Some of the empirical premises underlying this position
seem plausible enough. The task of structural reform is
fraught with danger, not just in defining the rights, but also
in implementing them within the operation of the state bu-
reaucracy. It may also be true - note I only say "may" -
that the risk of judicial error in dispute resolution is not nearly
as great as it is in structural reform: in many instances there
is virtually nothing to the remedial phase in dispute resolution,
simply declaring whether plaintiff or defendant wins, nothing
to compare to the difficulties inherent in the reorganization of
an ongoing social institution, a public school system, a welfare
department, or worse yet, an institution we know the least
about, a prison. All of this may be safely conceded without,
I am certain, accepting the normative conclusion that idealizes
dispute resolution.
68 See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
920-22 (1979) (describing the incipient departures from this established practice).
69 D. HoRowiTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 264 (i977).
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In the first place it is not clear why any social institution
should be devoted to one and only one task, even the one it
does best. Traditional separation of powers doctrine assumes
a differentiation of judicial power from that of the executive
and legislative branches, but it does not require that the dif-
ferentiation be along formal as opposed to functional lines, nor
does it require that any branch be devoted to one function
alone. (Legislators, for example, spend considerable time on
constituent services.) Each of the three great divisions of pow-
ers may have several different functions. The performance of
one function may interfere with another, failures in one do-
main impair its capacity to perform in others, but there is no
reason to believe that the relationship between the structural
and dispute-resolution modes of discharging the judicial func-
tion is one of interference, that involvement in the structural
litigation will compromise the judiciary's capacity to resolve
disputes. The functions may well be independent, or maybe
even complementary.
7 0
Furthermore, even if a choice must be made between the
two functions, the instrumental critique assumes too narrow
a criterion of choice in insisting that we preserve that function
the institution performs best. Success rate is important in
evaluating institutions, but two further factors must be intro-
duced into the analysis: the value of a successful performance,
and the success rate of alternative institutions performing com-
parable tasks. On either criterion, structural reform fares quite
well.
The hypothesized low success rate of structural reform is
amply compensated by the promise of greater social returns.
If the choice be between resolving a dispute between two
individuals, such as a dispute between a citizen and a police-
man over some alleged incident of wrongdoing, or on the other
hand, trying to eradicate conditions of lawlessness through a
reorganization of the police department, the claim that the first
is more likely to be "successful" clearly does not make it the
more socially worthwhile enterprise, in terms of either the
breadth of the corrective action or its durability. Success may
come more rarely or less perfectly in a structural case, but a
structural success, even if it is only partial, may well dwarf
all the successes of dispute resolution; it may greatly reduce
the need for dispute resolution by eliminating the conditions
that give rise to incidents of wrongdoing; and it may even
compensate for all its own failures.
70 Though each may have its own problem. See p. 53 infta.
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The instrumental critique might have more appeal if it
were clear that there were alternative institutions that could
better perform this worthwhile but perilous activity. But just
the opposite is true. Dispute resolution might be diverted to
arbitration, but obviously such a diversion is not available for
structural reform. It is among the most public of all forms of
adjudication, involving constitutional values and the state bu-
reaucracies. Some have suggested administrative agencies as
the alternative, on the theory that these agencies might have
some special expertise in the reorganization of ongoing social
institutions not otherwise available to courts. But this sugges-
tion also seems without basis. Before explaining why, let me
emphasize that my intent is not to deny a role for administra-
tive agencies in the constitutional domain, in the effort to give
meaning to our constitutional values through structural reform,
but only to suggest that their claim of special competency is
not so strong as to altogether oust the courts, to justify trans-
ferring structural reform from the courts to administrative
agencies, leaving the courts to do nothing more than resolve
disputes. The instrumental critique must make a claim as
strong as that in order to idealize dispute resolution as the
judicial function and to accuse courts of acting illegitimately
whenever they undertake structural reform.
The claim for diversion is largely predicated on the view
that these administrative agencies possess some expert knowl-
edge, and yet I for one fail to see the evidence to support that
position. The instrumental critic in essence makes a compar-
ative argument, one about the superiority of administrative
agencies, but only attempts to document one-half of that ar-
gument. He typically points to "failures" of the courts, but
never considers the "failures" of the administrative agencies,
of which there are many. The literature is filled with the
evidence of administrative failures, 7 1 and teaches us to be
wary of the claim of administrative expertise, also voiced at
earlier times by the Progressives. Admittedly, structural re-
form is a perilous and arduous activity, but the problem is
largely one of knowledge, knowing how large-scale organiza-
7, See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978); J. GETMAN, S. GOLD-
BERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS (1976). See also R. RABIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1979). The myth of expertise is
not confined to administrative agencies, see, e.g., Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and
Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978), nor even
to the law, see, e.g., J. HABERMAS, Technology and Science as "Ideology," in TOWARD
A RATIONAL SOCIETY 81 (1970); I. ILLICH, TOWARD A HISTORY OF NEEDS (1977).
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tions operate, not the distribution of that knowledge among
various agencies. I doubt whether there is some special body
of knowledge relevant for such a remedial undertaking, but
even if there were, it still remains to be seen why it could not
be made available to the judge, either through expert wit-
nesses, or through auxiliary structures such as special mas-
ters. The evidentiary process of the administrative agency has
long promised to be more open, broader, and freewheeling
than that available to the judiciary, but it is not clear to me
that this promise has ever been fulfilled, that such a liberated
process would be consistent with rudimentary notions of due
process, or even that such a process is needed for structural
reform. The focus of a structural suit is necessarily broad,
concerned with social conditions and organizational dynamics,
not discrete and particularized incidents of wrongdoing; but
the judicial process is capable of that breadth. Some might,
I realize, emphasize the insight that comes from accumulated
experience, rather than a body of knowledge that could be
communicated to a decisionmaker; yet it is hard to see how
this reformulation of the claim of expertise advances the
cause. Some judges have been engaged in the reconstructive
enterprise over a long period of time, say a decade, and
though, as we will see, 72 this involvement creates its own
problems, it probably dwarfs all the experience presently pos-
sessed by administrative agencies on how to reconstruct on-
going social institutions.
The argument for diversion to administrative agencies thus
seems to rest on exaggerated claims of expertise, a recurrence
of a myth of Progressivism, but even more fundamentally it
reflects a misunderstanding of why courts are involved in the
first place. Courts are not entrusted with the reconstructive
task on the theory that they possess some expertise (either in
the form of knowledge or experience) on how best to perform
that task. In the domain of instrumentalism, of means-end
rationality, courts have no special claim to competency. Their
special competency lies elsewhere, in the domain of constitu-
tional values, a special kind of substantive rationality, and
that expertise is derived from the special quality of the judicial
process - dialogue and independence. The reconstructive en-
deavor, calling for instrumental judgments, should be seen (for
reasons to be elaborated later 73) as but a necessary incident of
that meaning-giving enterprise, as an attempt by the judge to
give meaning to constitutional values in practical reality.
72 See p. 53 infra.
73 See p. 52 infra.
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Thus, even if one were to assume, as the instrumental critique
would have us do, that administrative agencies possess an
expertise in the domain of instrumental rationality, the diver-
sion argument would still be deeply problematic because ad-
ministrative agencies lack any special competency in this par-
ticular domain of substantive rationality. They lack the
independence that is so essential for giving expression to our
constitutional values.
The specialized jurisdictions of administrative agencies may
lend support to the claim of expertise, but it also poses a threat
to the independence of the agency: the regulators become too
closely identified with the regulated. 74 More fundamentally,
administrative agencies are, as the Progressives well-realized,
more tied to majoritarian politics than are courts, both because
of ideology (they are sometimes allowed to make their judg-
ments on the basis of the preferences of the body politic) and
institutional arrangements (appointment for short terms, sub-
ject to removal when administrations change). The so-called
independent regulatory agencies of the federal system might be
seen as standing somewhere between the courts, on the one
hand, and Congress and the Executive, on the other, but
surely their relationship to the majoritarian branches is close
enough as to make us wary of any claim, such as that embod-
ied in the instrumental critique, that would make them the
exclusive or even the primary agencies for giving meaning to
our constitutional values. The truth of this assertion would
be, I venture to say, conceded in most contexts. It seems no
less true - maybe even more so - when the threat to those
values is posed by the bureaucracies of the modern state and
when structural reform is needed to remove that threat.
A second method for establishing the priority of the dis-
pute-resolution model is historical - dispute resolution is "tra-
ditional," and structural reform "new." Support for this po-
sition comes from Abram Chayes, who in an important, recent
article75 identified a mode of adjudication that is quite similar
to the structural one (though he attributes its formal charac-
teristics to the "public" character of the rights, while I see
them more linked to the organizational setting - all rights
74 The dynamics of cooptation in the administrative field may be especially tied
to the linkage of specialized jurisdiction and short term appointments (the adminis-
trator develops an expertise that has a limited market). As such, the loss of inde-
pendence of the regulator from the regulatee may be more severe in the administrative
domain than in the judicial, and less curable.
7- Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281 (1976). For a parallel and important account of contemporary civil litigation,
see Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937 (I975).
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enforced by courts are public). He celebrates the "new" model,
but, rather than centrally dealing with the questions of legiti-
macy, he emphasizes the positivistic or descriptive dimensions
of his enterprise. He presents himself as a "biologist" describ-
ing the "evolution" of a "new" form of adjudication, which
will, he adds secondarily, legitimate itself by winning the as-
sent of the people, provided it is given chance to work.
I have my doubts as to whether the historical claim is
wholly accurate as a purely descriptive matter. To my mind,
what has evolved has been the form of adjudication, but not
the function. The function of adjudication, whether in the
nineteenth century or twentieth century, torts or criminal law,
contract or antitrust, McCulloch v. Maryland76 or Brown v.
Board of Education,77 has not been to resolve disputes be-
tween individuals, but rather to give meaning to our public
values. What has changed is social structure, the emergence
of a society dominated by the operation of large-scale organi-
zations, and it is these changes in social structure that account
for the changes over time in adjudicatoryforms. Such changes
should hardly be a cause for concern. What would, in fact,
provoke a genuine crisis of legitimacy would be to insist on
procedural modes shaped in a different social setting, to as-
sume that adjudicatory forms created centuries ago should
control today.
But, even assuming for a moment that the dispute-resolu-
tion model has a claim to historical priority, it remains to be
seen what that has to do with legitimacy, which is essentially
a normative judgment. One response to this puzzlement may
try to link dispute resolution with the "case or controversy"
requirement of article HI, but this claim is without founda-
tion. There is nothing in the text of article HI - in the rather
incidental use of the words "cases" or "controversies" - that
constitutionally constricts the federal courts to dispute resolu-
tion. The late eighteenth century was the heyday for the
common law, and, though that litigation may inform the con-
struction of the words "cases" and "controversies," the function
of courts under the common law was paradigmatically not
dispute resolution, but to give meaning to public values
through the enforcement and creation of public norms, such
as those embodied in the criminal law and the rules regarding
property, contracts, and torts.7 8 The courts created our law.
They were the central lawmaking institutions. The judicial
function implied by contemporary constitutional litigation, of
76 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 36 (I81g).
77 347 U.S. 483 (954).
78 See M. HORWIT, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 178o-i860M , at
1-30 (I977). See also note 64 supra.
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which structural reform is part, is continuous with and maybe
even identical to that of the common law. The issues have
changed, and so has the social setting; that has required a
change in the form of adjudication, though not its function.
Alternatively, it may be thought that the historical critique
derives its normative power not from article III, but from the
application of a theory that sees the people's "consent" as the
basis of legitimacy. 79 This argument equates "implied con-
sent" with "actual.consent," interprets the people's acceptance
of the status quo as implying a consent to the existing insti-
tutional arrangements, and then locates the dispute-resolution
model - but not the structural one - in the status quo. Such
an argument might seem capable of transforming a historical
priority into a normative priority, but in truth the argument
falls, on a number of grounds.
First, one can wonder about this interpretation of the status
quo, which reads dispute resolution in and structural reform
out. Some historians, for example, Eisenberg and Yeazell,
find antecedents for contemporary institutional litigation in the
nineteenth century equity and receivership cases or the anti-
trust and bankruptcy cases of the early twentieth century.8 0
Indeed, following this line of thought one might also argue
that the very existence of the structural mode in constitutional
litigation for the past decade or so is sufficient to place it
within the status quo - it, too, implicitly has received the
people's consent.
A second response, primarily exemplified by Chayes,8 1 is
to table the question of legitimacy, to suggest that it has arisen
prematurely. Assent by the people need not be given prospec-
tively, in the way that might be suggested by the social con-
tract metaphor: all the people come together at one historic
moment and decide whether they wish to have a particular
social institution. Consent can also be earned. But that takes
time and thus structural reform should be given a chance to
operate - a so-called trial run (assuming the past decade has
not been sufficient). If it survives, it will then be given the
same claim to legitimacy as the so-called traditional model: the
institution will have legitimated itself.
A third response - and the one that seems most appealing
to me - is to question consent theory itself. In part, the
problem with the theory is one of ambiguity. What is it that
'9 The most ambitious attempt to relate consent theory to courts is Shapiro, supra
note 65. As might be expected, it ultimately rests on the story, discussed p. 29 supra,
that links dispute settlement and the evolution of courts.
8o Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 60. See also 0. Fiss, supra note 57, at 325-
414; Chayes, supra note 75, at 1303.
S Chayes, supra note 75, at 1313-16.
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one consents to when one "accepts" the status quo in adjudi-
cation? Is it the form? Or the function? Or is it the substan-
tive results? Consent theory fails to answer these questions,
or even to suggest a procedure for working toward answers,
and as a consequence transforms the historical argument into
an endorsement of the status quo. It might well work a co-
lossal collapse of "is" and "ought." Beyond that, however, one
can question the very premise upon which this critique of
structural reform rests - the identification of consent with
legitimacy. Institutions can seek their justifications in domains
other than consent, even in a democracy.
A democratic political system is one ultimately dependent
upon the consent of the people, but each and every institution
need not be founded on consent. Consent goes to the system,
not the particular institution; it operates on the whole rather
than each part. The legitimacy of particular institutions, such
as courts, depends not on the consent - implied or otherwise -
of the people, but rather on their competence, on the special
contribution they make to the quality of our social life. 82 Le-
gitimacy depends on the capacity of the institution to perform
a function within the political system and its willingness to
respect the limitations on that function. Legitimacy does not
depend on popular approval of the institution's performance,
and even less on popular approval of the processes through
which that performance is rendered. It is the legitimacy of the
political system as a whole that depends on the people's ap-
proval, and that is the source of its democratic character.
The people have the power to express their disapproval of
how courts are discharging their function. Presumably, they
can pass statutes to curb procedural innovations, or they can
adopt constitutional amendments for overturning particular
outcomes. Some might argue that the failure of the people to
exercise this power is "implied approval" of all that the courts
are doing today, but such an argument would be mistaken
(this is surely a situation when inaction is not tantamount to
action), and more importantly, it is unnecessary. The existence
of the power of the people to express disapproval should be
understood as the means by which institutions such as courts
can be integrated into a system ultimately founded on the
people's consent. Some institutions - the legislature, the
school board, the police chief - may have a tighter, more
direct connection to consent: particular incumbents serve at
the pleasure of the people. To insist upon a similar consensual
2 This way of looking at the matter was first suggested by G. Zweifach, Insti-
tutional Reform and Paradigms of the Judiciary (1979) (unpublished manuscript on
file at the Yale Law School Library and the Harvard Law Review).
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connection for the judiciary would, however, impair its inde-
pendence and thus destroy its capacity to discharge its consti-
tutional function within our political system.
For these reasons it seems impossible to ground the histor-
ical critique either on article IlI or on consent theory, and thus
it, like the instrumental critique, fails to give dispute-resolution
a normative priority. There is one further strategy to be con-
sidered, the one I called axiomatic. It postulates some formal
attribute of a social process as a morally necessary attribute,
on the basis of which the structural and dispute-resolution
modes are to be evaluated. As it turns out, that attribute -
individual participation, present in dispute resolution, absent
in the structural mode - also implicates consent theory and
shares many of its difficulties. It places adjudication on a
moral plane with two other activities exalted by consent the-
ory, voting and bargaining, and then tries to construct an ideal
form of adjudication that preserves this connection with con-
sensual activity, now in a highly individualized form, though
it still fails to explain why consent is the touchstone of legiti-
macy of all institutions.
The most sustained effort to build a case for dispute reso-
lution on the basis of moral axioms is Lon Fuller's essay, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication.8 3 This essay was written
in the late 3950's, shortly before the heyday of structural re-
form. It was published in 1978, shortly after Professor Fuller's
death, but was not updated to account, either as a descriptive
or normative matter, for the intervening twenty years, the civil
rights era.84 It is as though the period never occurred - an
erasure of some portion of the history of procedure. The essay
is nevertheless important for our purposes, for it seems largely
motivated by a desire to establish the limits of adjudication,
and the one limit Fuller in fact develops is clearly at war with
the notion of structural reform. Borrowing an idea of Michael
Polanyi, interestingly enough also introduced in the 195o's,85
Fuller insists that courts cannot perform "polycentric" tasks.
Fuller does not give any single, straightforward definition
of polycentrism. It seems to refer to a type of dispute or
problem which is many centered, much like, he says, a spider
web, in the sense that a resolution of a polycentric dispute
83 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
84 During this so-year period the essay did not lie dormant: it was used in Professor
Fuller's courses at Harvard, it received a wide "underground" circulation in mimeo-
graphed form, it was widely cited, and portions appeared in two articles by Fuller:
Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. I (ig6o), and
Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3.
85 M. PoLANyi, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY (1951).
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would necessarily have broad and never-ending repercus-
sions. These disputes are to Fuller inappropriate for adjudi-
cation. Fuller explains why through an analysis of a series of
examples. One example, appearing near the end of the essay,
seems, remarkably enough, to address the problem of struc-
tural reform:
The suggestion that polycentric problems are often solved
by a kind of "managerial intuition" should not be taken to
imply that it is an invariable characteristic of polycentric
problems that they resist rational solution. There are rational
principles for building bridges of structural steel. But there
is no rational principle which states, for example, that the
angle between girder A and girder B must always be 45
degrees. This depends on the bridge as a whole. One cannot
construct a bridge by conducting successive separate argu-
ments concerning the proper angle for every pair of intersect-
ing girders. One must deal with the whole structure.8 6
One is left to wonder why adjudication must proceed on the
basis Fuller suggests - angle by angle. Certainly that is not
required by rationality; reason, even that of the judge, is not
binary; it need not proceed angle by angle, but can encompass
whole structures. The explanation seems much more concrete,
it has to do with the enormous number of people affected by
whole structures - by the construction of the bridge. It is
simply impossible, Fuller explains, to have everyone affected
participate in the lawsuit in a meaningful way. 87
At the core then of Fuller's conception of the limits of
adjudication and his objection to having courts resolve poly-
centric problems is the individual's right to participate in a
proceeding that might adversely affect him. This right might
be preserved in a representative suit that accords with the
traditional law of agency, where there is a true consensual
bond between representative (agent) and principal, but it
should be recognized that this right, taken in its highly indivi-
dualistic cast, is denied, indeed seriously compromised, by the
kind of representation lying at the heart of a structural suit -
86 Fuller, supra note 83, at 403.
87 In discussing another example, wage and price controls in a socialist regime,
Fuller gives a more complete explanation of the source of the problem:
[Ilt is simply impossible to afford each affected party a meaningful participation
through proofs and arguments. It is a matter of capital importance to note
that it is not merely a question of the huge number of possibly affected parties,
significant as that aspect of the thing may be. A more fundamental point is
that [each possible solution] would have a different set of repercussions and
might require in each instance a redefinition of the "parties affected."
Id. at 394-95.
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the representation of interests by spokesmen for groups and
offices rather than identifiable individuals.8 8 Just imagine the
kind of representation implicit in the famed Arkansas prison
litigation, in which the court's conclusion - for example, that
the trusty system at Cummins Farm was a form of cruel and
unusual punishment - must necessarily affect a never-ending
spiral of persons, officers, and interests: inmates, guards, ad-
ministrators, legislators, taxpayers, indeed all the citizens of
the state - present and future.8 9 The reconstruction of a
prison, or for that matter the reconstruction of a school system,
a welfare agency, a hospital, or any bureaucracy, is as poly-
centric as the construction of a bridge. All require the court
to deal with whole structures. The judge must be certain that
the full range of interests is vigorously represented, but he
need not turn his back on the constitutional claim or deny an
effective remedy because each and every individual affected
will not or cannot meaningfully participate in the suit.
My conception of adjudication starts from the top - the
office of the judge - and works down. I place adjudication
on a moral plane with legislative and executive action. I start
with the conception of state power embodied in the judge,
treat courts as a coordinate source of government power, and
see the form of adjudication shaped by function and social
setting. Fuller rejects such an approach. He starts from the
bottom and works up. Fuller starts with the individual, rather
than the judge. He places adjudication on a moral plane with
elections and contracts, analyzes these two social processes in
terms of how the individual participates in each, through vot-
ing and bargaining, and then seeks to distinguish adjudication
from these social processes. The distinguishing feature of ad-
judication, naturally enough, is also cast in individualistic
terms, more precisely, in terms of how the individual partici-
pates in that process as opposed to elections and contracts -
through proof and reasoned arguments. He then treats this
right of the individual to participate in the proceeding - the
moral equivalent of the right to vote and the right to bargain -
as the master idea of adjudication. For Fuller, it explains
and justifies certain formal features of adjudication, for ex-
ample, party structure and the passivity of the judge. It also
sets limits on adjudication. The right of individual partici-
pation is violated only at a distinct moral risk - the process
88 But cf. Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process:
An Essayfor Lon Fuller, 92 HARv. L. REV. 410, 427 (1978).
89 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373-76 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also note 28 supra.
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is deemed not a form of adjudication, or at best a mixed or
hybrid form of adjudication, "parasitic" upon the ideal.
At various points Fuller speaks as though he is being
merely descriptive. What distinguishes adjudication from
other social processes, he says, is the "institutional commit-
ment" of adjudication to a particular mode of individual par-
ticipation. On a purely descriptive level there is not much to
his claim. It is not supported by a presentation of the evidence
and it is contradicted by a great deal of the reality or experi-
ence that we would consider to be adjudication. Moreover, a
purely descriptive account could never yield the normative
judgments implicit in his conclusion as to what might consti-
tute "parasitic" adjudication. Fuller's essay should be recog-
nized for what it is: a postulation that the standard for judging
the legitimacy of a process that purports to be adjudication is
the affected individual's right to participate. I say "postula-
tion," for although much of the essay rightly celebrates the
role of reason in human affairs, and sees the important con-
nection between reason and adjudication, there is no expla-
nation of why reason requires the kind of individual partici-
pation that Fuller insists upon. In structural reform reason
enters the process, not through the arguments of each and
every individual affected, but through the arguments of the
spokesmen for all the interests represented and through the
decision of the judge. Reason is used to give meaning to our
constitutional values.
How might an axiom such as Fuller's, proclaiming the
sacredness of the individual right of participation, be judged?
I realize that it may not be appropriate to demand justification
of an axiom, for it is offered as a starting point, a proposition
that you cannot look behind. Yet there must be more that
can be said about it. Acceptance of an axiom must turn on
something more than a momentary flash of intuition. In my
judgment, the axiom can be assessed in terms of its conse-
quences and its underlying social vision. An axiom might at
first glance seem attractive enough, but its appeal may decline
radically once its full implications are understood.
In assessing the consequences of the individual participa-
tion axiom it should first be understood that the issue is not
whether there should be social processes that can further the
participatory right - whether dispute resolution should exist -
but whether a form of adjudication that violates that right -
structural reform - is legitimate (or permissible). Fuller
treats the participation axiom as a necessary condition, and
that is the source of the problem. As a necessary condition,
the axiom would render structural reform illegitimate, true
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enough, but more importantly, it would render illegitimate
almost all adjudication - both of the common law and the
constitutional variety - in which the courts were creating
public norms. It would reduce courts to the function of norm
enforcement, and reduce adjudication to a high-class (but sub-
sidized) form of arbitration. It is no mere happenstance that
Fuller spent a great deal of his professional life as an arbitra-
tor; throughout the essay he refers to the judge as an "arbiter."
, Virtually all public norm creation is polycentric. It affects
as many people as structural reform, and equally impairs the
capacity of each of the affected individuals to participate in
the process. More often than not, there is a myriad of possible
rules or solutions that could be formulated in each case. Con-
sider the fellow-servant rule, the stop-look-and-listen doctrine,
strict liability, the consideration requirement, the rules respect-
ing offer and acceptance, the norms of the Marshall Court
regarding the commerce clause, those of the Warren Court
regarding free speech, racial equality, civil and criminal pro-
cedure. The list could go on and on. It would probably
include all judge-made law, and the doctrine of precedent
itself. The list surely includes many "mistakes" or "wrong
decisions," but that is not the issue: the issue is whether all
these acts of norm creation represent a misuse of the judicial
power, an incorrect appropriation of the concept of "adjudi-
cation." This is a conclusion that most of us - or maybe
even all of us - would reject and yet it is a conclusion that
would seem to follow from Fuller's axiom.
It should also be recognized that this axiom - like the
liberty-of-contract doctrine of an earlier age - would be but
a formal triumph of individualism. The axiom seems to cel-
ebrate the individual, but would leave the individual at the
mercy of large aggregations of power - in Lochner,90 the
corporation; here, the state bureaucracies. Deprived of the
opportunity to use the courts to protect himself, to have the
full use of these centers of government power that stand apart
from the state bureaucracies, the individual is thrown back to
those social processes that are supposed to respect his partici-
patory right - dispute resolution, voting, and bargaining.
Each of these processes has important roles to play in our
social life, but it is hard to believe that any of them enhance
the real or effective - as opposed to the formal - power of
those individuals who are abused by the large-scale organiza-
90 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (i9o5); see W. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus
W. Peckham: The Police Power and the Individual in a Changing World (i979)
(unpublished manuscript on file at the Yale Law School Library and the Harvard Law
Review); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (19o9).
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tions of the modern state, the school system, the hospital, the
welfare department, or, even worse, the prison.
In truth, the individual participation axiom is rooted in a
world that no longer exists. It is rooted in a horizontal world,
in which people related to one another on individual terms
and on terms of approximate equality. It is rooted in a world
that viewed the law of contracts as The Law - not so inci-
dentally, Fuller's substantive field of law. Our world, how-
ever, is a vertical one; the market has been replaced by the
hierarchy, the individual entrepreneur by the bureau. 91 In this
social setting, what is needed to protect the individual is the
establishment of power centers equal in strength and equal in
resources to the dominant social actors; what is needed is
countervailing power. A conception of adjudication that
strictly honors the right of each affected individual to partici-
pate in the process seems to proclaim the importance of the
individual, but actually leaves the individual without the in-
stitutional support necessary to realize his true self. In fact,
the individual participation axiom would do little more than
throw down an impassable bar - polycentrism - to the one
social process that has emerged with promise for preserving
our constitutional values and the ideal of individualism in the
face of the modern bureaucratic state - structural reform.
92
III. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY
Dispute resolution, either as a statement of form or func-
tion, does not represent the ideal for adjudication, and thus
the departures from that model of adjudication entailed in
structural reform do not in and of themselves deprive that
mode of adjudication of its legitimacy. The function of ad-
judication is to give meaning to public values, not merely to
resolve disputes. Structural reform is faithful to that function,
and adapts the traditional form of the lawsuit to the changing
social reality - the dominance of our social life by bureau-
cratic organizations. A question of legitimacy might still per-
sist, however, because, wholly apart from any comparisons to
the dispute-resolution model, the entitlement of courts to speak
the law - to give meaning to our constitutional values - is
91 See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANI-
ZATION 329-41 (T. Parsons ed. 1947); 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 25.
92 This model of adjudication has a relevance even beyond the state bureaucracy;
it may be used to safeguard public values from the threats posed by the so-called
private bureaucracies, such as the corporation or union. See, e.g., Stone, Controlling
Corporate Misconduct, 49 PUB. INTEREST 55 (1977); Note, Monitors: A New Equitable
Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 1o3 (ig6o).
[Vol. 93:1
HeinOnline -- 93 Harv. L. Rev.  44 1979-1980
THE SUPREME COURT -FOREWORD
limited. It is limited, as I suggested at the outset, by the
judge's willingness and ability to adhere to a process that
typifies the judicial branch and constitutes the foundation of
its competence - dialogue and independence.
Structural reform does not pose any distinct threats to the
dialogic quality of this process - the obligation of the judge
to confront grievances he would otherwise prefer to ignore, to
listen to the broadest possible range of persons and interests,
to assume individual responsibility for the decision, and to
justify the decision in terms of the norms of the constitutional
system. The transformation of party structure inherent in the
structural suit stretches the notion of a dialogue, but to fault
the structural suit on that ground is to overread a metaphor,
to think that it refers to a conversation between two.- The
term "dialogue" is simply meant to suggest a rationalistic or
communicative process in which the judge listens and speaks
back. That process is no less possible in the multiparty con-
text, though the visual imagery shifts from a triad to an ar-
ray. It just requires a little skill and imagination.
Admittedly, the capacity or even the willingness of judges
to engage in this communicative process, to listen to all griev-
ances and to painstakingly justify their decisions, is far from
secure. Like an art, it always seems in peril. But the principal
threats to this capacity - impatience, self-righteousness, ju-
dicial burnout - have nothing to do with structural reform;
or to put the same point somewhat differently, these threats
to the integrity of the judicial process can be fought in ways
that leave the structural suit untouched as a distinctive mode
of constitutional litigation. Some of the critics of structural
reform also voice the recurrent gripe that judges are over-
worked. 93 Though overwork might well threaten the integrity
of the communicative process that lies at the core of adjudi-
cation, it is far from clear why the remedy should lie in the
elimination of the structural suit. Each one is complex and
difficult, but at the same time it may engage the judge in his
most worthy and important function. A more sensible re-
sponse to the claim of overwork may be to divert to other
93 This claim has its counterpart in earlier times, though then it was primarily
used as part of a criticism of the activism of the newly formed Warren Court, see,
e.g., Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1959); for a spirited reply see Arnold, Professor Harts
Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (ig6o). The claim of overwork often appears as
the rock bottom defense of a Supreme Court practice that seems very much in tension
with the competency-giving process, the failure of the Court to explain its choice of
cases. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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institutions the simpler, less complex cases (individual citizen
versus individual policeman, inmate versus guard); they may
represent a considerable burden taken as an aggregate. It may
also be necessary to increase the social resources committed to
the judicial branch. We cannot expect any agency of govern-
ment to discharge its function adequately when it is forced to
operate on a commitment of resources that reflect the needs of
an earlier age. It would of course be a sad irony, indeed it
would seriously jeopardize his legitimacy, if these resources
were used to convert each judge into a minibureaucracy. The
dialogue that has so far typified the judicial branch, and that
underlies its claim of special competency, envisions individual
responsibility for the decision and its justification. The judge
must be the one who listens and speaks back.
Though these matters cannot be easily dismissed, my con-
cern is not with the dialogic quality-of the competency-giving
process, but rather with the ideal of independence and the
threat posed to that ideal by the remedy. The remedy ex-
presses the judge's desire to give a meaning to a constitutional
value that is more tangible, more fullblooded than a mere
declaration of what is right. This desire to be efficacious is
manifest in all forms of adjudication, and creates similar di-
lemmas for the judge, but in structural reform it takes on a
special urgency and largely gives this form of constitutional
litigation its special cast. The desire to be efficacious leads the
judge to attempt the remarkable feat of reconstructing a state
bureaucracy, say, transforming a dual school system into a
unitary one, and that ambition in turn forces the judge to
abandon his position of independence and to enter the world
of politics.
A. The New Formalism
To understand the roots of the dilemma it is necessary to
understand the complicated relationship between rights and
remedies. To do that we must first free ourselves from the
hold of what has become known as the tailoring principle -
the insistence that the remedy must fit the violation.
At first it seemed that the tailoring principle was of un-
questionable validity; indeed, it might be tautological. The
problem seemed not to be the principle itself but the definition
of the violation - the Court had defined the violation too
narrowly. The principle was quietly introduced in Swann
94
94 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971). In fact, Swann sustained the most untailored remedy
imaginable, and the very invocation of the tailoring principle suggested a broad
conception of the violation. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case - Its Signif-
icancefor Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Cmi. L. REv. 697 (197).
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but was first applied in a case in which the Burger Court
upset a metropolitan desegregation plan, 95 a result that might
be traced to an exceedingly narrow view of the equal protec-
tion violation, namely, that it consisted of incidents of wrong-
doing - past acts of discrimination - rather than a social
condition - the segregated pattern of student attendance.
96
I now believe the problem is deeper: the tailoring principle
fundamentally misleads. It does in fact tend to support an
artificial conception of "violation" - one that looks back and
that sees discrete incidents as the object of the remedy - but
it also errs in an even more basic way. It suggests that the
relationship between remedy and violation is deductive or for-
mal, and thereby gives us an impoverished notion of remedy.
Deduction, strictly speaking, is never possible in the law,
as the authors of the tailoring principle might well concede.
There are, however, certain features of the tailoring principle,
particularly the concept of "fit," that suggest that the connec-
tion between violation and remedy has a highly formalistic,
almost a deductive quality, with the violation serving as the
premise and the remedy the conclusion: (a) the violation is
viewed as the exclusive source of the remedy; (b) each specific
provision of the remedy is explicable in terms of the violation;
(c) it is assumed that there is a unique remedy, in the same
way that there is a single conclusion to a syllogism; and (d)
the remedy, also like the conclusion, is thought to follow from
the violation with a high degree of certainty. In the structural
context these formalistic qualities - exclusivity, a fully deter-
mined specificity, uniqueness, and certainty - are never pres-
ent. The structural remedy is decidedly instrumental.
The object of the structural remedy is not to eliminate a
"violation" in the sense implied by the tailoring principle, but
rather to remove the threat posed by the organization to the
constitutional values. The concept "violation" can be used to
describe the object of the remedy only if it is understood in a
95 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 7,7 (I974). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
96 This is further suggested by several post-Milliken I cases, particularly Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (I976), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977). Washington v. Davis made segregative intent a necessary condition
for a violation, and Dayton limited the remedy to eliminating the "incremental seg-
regative effect" of the wrongful conduct, 433 U.S. at 420. Looking at the problem
of school desegregation from the perspective of these two cases, it seemed that the
architects of Swann and Keyes had been caught in a trap of their own making, for
Swann and Keyes would have us believe that the violations in those cases consisted
of the incidents of past discrimination, even though they called for systemwide rem-
edies. See Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY
& PUB. AFF. 3 (1974), reprinted in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 155
(M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977).
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prospective, dynamic, and systemic sense. It must also be
understood that there are many ways of eliminating the threat
(the violation, if you insist). Consider the well-known Lank-
ford case, 97 in which the police had engaged in a massive
manhunt in the black neighborhoods in Baltimore. They con-
ducted searches of suspects without probable cause and in a
manner and at a time that the court concluded was wholly
unjustified. This misconduct was part of a larger pattern of
abuses by the police, and the court perceived an urgent need
to protect fourth amendment values. It also became apparent
that this might be done in at least three different ways: (a) a
decree against the police officers, either at the operative or
supervisory level, prohibiting them from engaging in conduct
that violated the fourth amendment; (b) a decree requiring the
chief of police to establish an internal disciplinary agency that
would sanction individual police officers who engaged in such
misconduct; or (c) a decree establishing (subject to some minor
exceptions such as one for hot pursuits) that searches for sus-
pects be conducted only with a search warrant, not because
the fourth amendment required it, but as a means of checking
the abuses that occurred in this city. The court confronted
with a threat to fourth amendment values must choose among
these alternatives (and maybe even others), and the tailoring
principle distorts the remedial process by masking this basic
fact. It obscures the need for a choice, and the fact that the
remedial phase of a structural suit is largely devoted to making
that choice.
The tailoring principle also obscures the criteria of choice
in suggesting that the violation will be the exclusive source of
the remedy: it suggests that the shape of the remedy is exclu-
sively a function of the definition of the violation. The over-
riding mission of the structural decree is to remove the threat
posed to constitutional values by the organization, but there
are additional or subsidiary considerations - largely embraced
within the traditional concept of "equitable discretion" - that
play a critical role in the remedial process. They guide the
choice among the host of possible remedies, and shape the
terms of the alternative chosen. One set of subsidiary consid-
erations might be considered normative: they express values
other than the one that occasions the intervention. For ex-
ample, a school decree might be predicated on a desire to
eliminate a threat to racial equality, but other values - such
as respect for state autonomy,9 evenhandedness, or a min-
97 Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). For the decree actually
entered on remand see 0. Fiss, supra note 57, at i6.
98 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 704 n.i (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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imization of coercion - should be considered. Another set of
subsidiary considerations go to efficacy. They reflect the
judge's best judgment on how he might achieve his objective
of removing the threat to the constitutional value most effec-
tively.
These subsidiary considerations have, as we saw earlier,
an important bearing on some facets of the party structure -
the divergence between victims and beneficiaries of the
decree, and also on the identity of the office or agency that
bears the burden of the remedy. 99 They also give the struc-
tural decree a tentative and hesitant character. The familiar
pattern is for the judge to try - sometimes in different cases
and sometimes at different times in the same case - the whole
range of remedial alternatives. The judge must search for the
"best" remedy, but since his judgment must incorporate such
open-ended considerations as effectiveness and fairness, and
since the threat and constitutional value that occasions the
intervention can never be defined with great precision, the
particular choice of remedy can never be defended with any
certitude. It must always be open to revision, even without
the strong showing traditionally required for modification of
a decree, 100 namely, that the first choice is causing grievous
hardship. A revision is justified if the remedy is not working
effectively or is unnecessarily burdensome.
These subsidiary considerations also explain the specifics
usually found in the final stages of a structural injunction.
The specifics range from the date and content of the reports
that must be submitted to the court on performance to the
duties of the various institutional operatives. For some, these
specifics are baffling: how can it be that the Constitution re-
quires a report on September 15, or showers at iio°F, or a
thirty-day limitation on confinement in an isolation cell? 101
The bafflement, it seems to me, results from a failure to re-
cognize the instrumental character of the remedy, and the
important role played by considerations of efficacy and fairness
in shaping that instrument. It incorrectly assumes, as the
tailoring principle permits, that the violation - viewed as a
reciprocal of a constitutional right - is the exclusive source
of each and every term of the remedy. It assumes that the
remedy fits the violation in the same way that a suit of clothing
99 See pp. 22, 24 supra.
100 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. io6 (1932). See generally Note,
Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 8o HARv. L. REv. 1303 (1967).
101 See e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711-14 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
97 (1976).
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fits the body, with each nuance of the suit being traced to a
twist in the body.
Specificity is not a fixed rule; there may be some distinct
advantages to ambiguity as a technique of control. But when
specificity is present, it can usually be traced to considerations
of efficacy and sometimes to general considerations of fairness
(such as notice). It is these considerations that block the at-
tribution of these specifics "back into" the Constitution. The
rights these considerations give rise to might be thought of as
instrumental or remedial rights rather than constitutional
rights proper, but it is equally important to recognize that
these instrumental or remedial rights are created by courts in
discharge of their constitutional function. The Constitution
does not say anything about reports, showers, or isolation cells;
much less does it say anything about the date reports are due,
the temperature of showers, or the maximum numbers of days
that can be spent in an isolation cell. But it does say some-
thing about equality and humane treatment, and a court trying
to give meaning to those values may find it both necessary and
appropriate - as a way of bringing the organization within
the bounds of the Constitution - to issue directives on these
matters. The court may also find it necessary and appropriate
to be quite specific in these directives, either as a way of
minimizing the risk of evasion or as a way of helping the
bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them.
B. The Dilemmas of Instrumentalism
The formalism of the tailoring principle fails to capture the
true nature of the remedial process required for structural
reform (and maybe for other types of relief as well). It is a
pretense that must be abandoned. The structural remedy must
be seen in instrumental terms. First, the remedy exists for
and is determined by some finite purpose, protecting the con-
stitutional value threatened; second, the remedy actually cho-
sen is one among many ways of achieving that purpose; and
third, the remedy incorporates considerations that might not
be rooted in any direct and obvious way in the constitutional
value that occasions the intervention. The remedy is shaped
in part - in critical part - by considerations of fairness and
strategy.
As an instrumental activity, structural reform will have its
share of failures in the sense that the threat to the constitu-
tional value may persist - so much is required to eliminate
the threat and so little is known about organizational behav-
ior. Failure is always possible with any instrumental activity;
and as a mode of thought, instrumentalism as opposed to
[Vol. 93:1
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formalism derives its appeal largely from the fact that it rec-
ognizes the possibility of failure. What is worrisome about the
instrumentalism implicit in structural reform is not the risk of
failure itself, but the fact that the reform is being undertaken
by a court. Even a "success" might raise questions of legiti-
macy because the legitimacy of the institution turns on criteria
that are independent of result. Legitimacy is largely a point
about institutional integrity.
Some might see the instrumentalism inherent in the reme-
dial process as inconsistent with the dictates of formal justice,
the requirement of treating similarly those who are similarly
situated; it might even be thought to be at odds with the idea
of a single, nationwide constitution. The subsidiary consid-
erations that give so much specific content to the remedy
might, for example, require a freedom-of-choice desegregation
plan in one community, while, in another, a geographic as-
signment plan would be best. Similar differences may emerge
in the reorganization of the prisons, hospitals, or welfare agen-
cies in various communities. Such a varying remedial pattern
has, in fact, emerged, but it does not seem to me to be objec-
tionable, for there may well be differences between the various
communities that justify the different treatment. Neither for-
mal justice nor the ideal of a single, nationwide constitution
requires that all communities be treated identically, but only
that similar communities be treated alike. 10 2 For me, the real
problem arises not from the varying remedial pattern, but
from an absence of a conceptual connection between the proc-
esses that give courts their special competency and instrumen-
tal judgments. '
0 3
The rightful place of courts in our political system turns
on the existence of public values and on the promise of those
institutions - because they are independent and because they
must engage in a special dialogue - to articulate and elaborate
the true meaning of those values. The task of discovering the
meaning of constitutional values such as equality, liberty, due
process, or property is, however, quite different from choosing
or fashioning the most effective strategy for actualizing those
values, for eliminating the threat posed to those values by a
state bureaucracy. 10 4 As I noted before, the judge has no
102 These themes plus the problem of uncertainty are developed more fully in
another article of mine, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
194, 215-16 (r975).
103 See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,
30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 7o6-I2 (1978).
104 The competency-giving processes of the judge, dialogue and independence,
have a conceptual connection to those subsidiary considerations that enter the remedial
process but have a more normative character, e.g., evenhandedness. The problem I
perceive relates to strategic considerations, so important to the success of the remedy.
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special claim of competency on instrumental judgments, on
means-end rationality, whether it be in the bureaucratic con-
text or elsewhere; he may be no worse than others, and now
and then be even better, but there is no general or systematic
reason for believing he will be better. There is no likely
connection between the core processes of adjudication, those
that give the judge the special claim to competence, and the
instrumental judgments necessarily entailed in fashioning the
remedy. Sometimes the best strategy is laid in silence and by
someone highly sensitive to the preferences of the body poli-
tic. 105 Why then do we entrust the remedial task to the judge?
Rights and remedies are but two phases of a single social
process - of trying to give meaning to our public values.
Rights operate in the realm of abstraction, remedies in the
world of practical reality. A right is a particularized and
authoritative declaration of meaning. It can exist without a
remedy - the right to racial equality, to be free of Jim Crow-
ism, can exist even if the court gave no relief (other than the
mere declaration). The right would then exist as a standard
of criticism, a standard for evaluating present social prac-
tices. A remedy, on the other hand, is an effort of the court
to give meaning to a public value in practice. A remedy is
more specific, more concrete, and more coercive than the mere
declaration of right; it constitutes the actualization of the right.
If the purpose of the remedy is to actualize the declared
right, then the remedy might be understood as subordinate to
the right. Yet it is also important to recognize that the mean-
ing of a public value is a function - a product or a conse-
quence - of both declaration and actualization. Rights and
remedies jointly constitute the meaning of the public value.
The declared right may be one of "racial equality," but if the
court adopts a "freedom-of-choice" plan as the mode of deseg-
regation then the right actualized is the right to choose schools
free of racial distinction (though subject to all the other re-
straints inherent in any process that relies on individual
choice). A constitutional value such as equality derives its
meaning from both spheres, declaration and actualization, and
it is this tight connection between meaning and remedy, not
just tradition, 10 6 that requires a unity of functions. It requires
10s Perhaps this explains one of the most striking features of opinions in structural
cases: the failure to discuss the remedy with any specificity at all. This silence is
probably more a function of embarrassment than an absence of self-awareness of the
factors that shaped the decree.
106 Compare Professor Bickel's account of the remedial function, suggesting it is
somehow tied to the duty of disposing of concrete controversies:
[T]he Court does not sit to make precatory pronouncements. It is not a synod
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that the decision about remedy be vested in the judge, the
agency assigned the task of giving meaning to the value
through declaration. A division of functions, a delegation of
the task of actualization to another agency, necessarily creates
the risk that the remedy might distort the right, and leave us
with something less than the true meaning of the constitutional
value. Both sources of meaning must be entrusted to the same
agency to preserve the integrity of the meaning-giving enter-
prise itself.
If the judge's function is to give meaning to our public
values, and the remedy must be understood as an integral part
of that process, then we can understand - and indeed appre-
ciate - the judge's involvement in reforming the state bu-
reaucracy. It is a necessary incident of his broader social
function. This is not, however, the end of the matter. Even
though the meaning-giving process may require a unity of
functions, the risk is always present that the performance of
one function may interfere with the other. This, in fact, occurs
in the structural context and constitutes the core dilemma. It
is not that actualization and declaration are analytically incom-
patible, but rather that they are very often in tension. Ac-
tualization of the structural variety creates a network of rela-
tionships and outlook - a dynamic - that threatens the
judge's independence and the integrity of the judicial enterprise
as a whole.
To some extent this threat is tied to a peculiar characteristic
of the structural remedy - it places the judge in an architec-
tural relationship with the newly reconstituted state bureauc-
racy. A judge deeply involved in the reconstruction of a school
system or prison is likely to lose much of his distance from the
organization. He is likely to identify with the organization he
is reconstructing, and this process of identification is likely to
deepen as the enterprise of organizational reform moves
through several cycles of supplemental relief, drawn out over
a number of years. There is, however, a deeper and more
pervasive threat to judicial independence, one that turns not
on the peculiar reconstructive character of the structural rem-
edy, but on the desire of the judge represented by the very
attempt to give a remedy, any remedy - the desire to be
efficacious.
of bishops, nor a collective poet laureate. It does not sit, Mr. Freund has
remarked, "to compose for the anthologies." If it did, its effectiveness would
be of an entirely different order; and if it did, we would not need to worry
about accommodating its function to the theory and practice of democracy.
The Court is an organ of government. It is a court of law, which wields the
power of government in disposing of concrete controversies.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 246-47 (1962) (footnote omitted).
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Judges are not all-powerful. They can decree some results
but not all. Some results depend on forces beyond their con-
trol. Judges can issue orders, and perhaps threaten the ad-
dressees of these orders - the officers within the hierarchy -
with contempt. But the success of the actualization process
depends on many other forces, less formal, less identifiable,
and perhaps even less reachable. The desegregation of a
school system is vulnerable to "white flight," that is, the ca-
pacity of white parents to withdraw from the public school
system altogether; the reforms of a police system may depend
on the cooperation of the Police Benevolent Association; the
reform of a total institution depends on preserving the intricate
fabric of personal relationship between keepers and inmates;
and the reform of the welfare bureaucracy - maybe of all
state bureaucracies - may well depend on increased appro-
priations and increased revenues. In each of these instances,
the judge may be able to devise strategies for inducing these
forces into supporting the structural reform - judges are
among the shrewdest persons I have known.107 But the issue
is not shrewdness, not the capacity of judges to devise strat-
egies for dealing with these limiting forces, but rather the very
need to devise these strategies and what the perception of this
need does to their sense of independence. Judges realize that
practical success vitally depends on the preferences, the will,
of the body politic.
This perception of dependence has obvious and important
implications for the remedy: no judge is likely to decree more
than he thinks he has the power to accomplish. The remedy
will be limited, and even more importantly it will be viewed
in adaptive terms. 108 The judge will seek to anticipate the
response of others, and though he may try to transcend the
limits imposed by that response, he is likely to accept the
reality of those limits and compromise his original objective in
107 The two most spectacular instances that come to my mind are: the New Jersey
school finance case, Robinson v. Cahill, 7o N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (z976) (per curiam);
see R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 128-30 (1978); and the Alabama prison case,
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified sub nor.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part and remanded sub
noma. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 78I (1978) (per curiam) (on xith amendment
grounds); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, §i, at 26, col. i (describing Judge Johnson's
latest strategy).
10 Compare Chayes, supra note 75, at 1298-302, who, adopting a consent theory
of legitimacy, celebrates the so-called negotiated quality of the decree, to the point of
exaggerating the consensual element in the remedial process. A structural suit can be
settled at the remedial stage in the same sense that it can be at the liability stage, but
neither type of settlement is consensual in the same way that a bilateral transaction
might be.
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order to obtain as much relief as possible. He will bargain
against the people's preferences. The remedy is, as we saw,
a vitally important part of the meaning of the public value,
and even if the remedy were all that were affected, all that
were compromised, there would be, reason to be concerned.
But the truth of the matter is that the stakes are likely to be
higher - the distortion will be felt in the realm of rights,
too.109 Just as it is reasonable to assume that a judge wishes
to be efficacious, it is also reasonable to assume that no judge
is anxious to proclaim his impotence. He will strive to lesseh
the gap between declaration and actualization. He will tailor
the right to fit the remedy.
Some measures might seem capable of preserving the in-
dependence of the judge, and thus of minimizing the threat to
the judicial enterprise. In the early years, recourse was made
to a rule of strict passivity in the remedial phase: the judge's
role was simply to decide whether the existing arrangements
were constitutional. If they were not, it was entirely the de-
fendant's responsibility to propose steps that would remedy the
situation. The judge was not to choose the remedy, nor even
assume a responsibility for implementing it, but leave the
remedial burden entirely on the defendant. If the defendant
failed to discharge that responsibility, recourse could be made
to the contempt power.
This rule left the judge in the awkward position of choosing
between a heavy and frequent use of criminal contempt power
or an endless series of declarations of what was unacceptable.
It soon became clear - particularly through the New Orleans
school crisis of the early 196o's1O - that neither alternative
would effectively desegregate the schools, produce results, and
as a consequence the courts abandoned this posture of strict
passivity. They began to participate actively in the fashioning
of remedies. They made clear their expectations as to what
would be acceptable and sometimes even fashioned the remedy
itself."' In either instance, strategic considerations entered
the judicial process: what the judges required was in part
shaped by what was obtainable - it was better to have some-
109 This point emerged in the course of discussions with the Friday luncheon
group - Geoffrey Aronow, Deborah Ashford, Robert Katzmann, Joel Beckman,
Martha Minow, Ann Wallwork, Gerson Zweifach. I am particularly grateful to the
members of the group for that idea and many others that appear in this essay.
110 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 204 F. Supp. 568, supplemented, 205
F. Supp. 893 (E.D. La.), modified, 308 F.2d 491 (5 th Cir. 1962). See also R. CRAIN,
THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1968).
I See cases cited note 2 supra. For a modem resurgence of the rule of deference,
see White v. Weister, 412 U.S. 783 (I973) (reapportionment).
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thing - maybe a grade a year, maybe freedom of choice
rather than nothing at all.
Today, the most vivid expression of the dilemma created
by the remedy is the creation of a new procedural institution,
the special master. As we saw, the special master serves as
an auxiliary spokesman in structural litigation; but he can also
be used as an intermediate structure, standing, if you will,
between the judge and the organization and also between the
judge and the body politic. 112 The special master will assume
the responsibility of both fashioning and implementing the
relief, on the theory that he will become the architect of the
newly reconstructed institution and that he, not the judge, is
the one who will become principally dependent on the good
will and cooperation of all those forces - the union, the
legislature, the angry parents - needed to make the remedial
process work. The special master is the judge's appointee, but
the hope is that once the authority is infused, the judge will
be able to stand in the background, return to his position of
independence, judging rather than wheeling-and-dealing.
113
The "success" of the special master in resolving the core
dilemma is largely dependent on preserving the ambiguity of
his status, 114 judge and non-judge, and that ambiguity is likely
to disappear over time. The success may be more apparent
than real. If the special master is not a judge, not an arm of
the judge, then the use of a special master represents a division
of functions, a denial of the very reason why we entrust the
remedial enterprise to the judge in the first place. The special
master would be but a new administrative agency, now created
by the judge rather than the legislature or executive, appointed
by the judge and subject to dismissal by the judge. 11 This
administrative agency might be thought to stand a little closer
to the courts than to the majoritarian branches than does the
typical administrative agency, but heavy reliance on an agency
112 G. Aronow, supra note 59; M. Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A
Strategy For Judicial Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees (1979) (unpublished
manuscript on file at the Yale Law School Library and the Harvard Law Review).
113 For a vivid account of the bargaining of the special master, and the judge's
attempt to recover his distance, see Berger, Away from the Court House and into the
Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978). See also
Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 6o COR-
NELL L. REV. 53 (1974).
"4 But cf. Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. io62, 1082-
85 (1979) (suggesting that the multiplicity of roles, which may be essential to maintain
this "ambiguity," may compromise the special master's legitimacy).
Is For another way of synthesizing functions, this time using the already estab-
lished administrative agencies, see Note, Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies
in Federal Administrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407 (1978).
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that is truly independent of the court would still present many
of the dangers to constitutionalism that would be entailed in
a division of functions. On the other hand, if the special
master is. a judge, or a mere extension of the judge, the unity
of functions would be preserved, but the special master could
not shield the judge from the threats to his independence; the
acts of the special master will be attributed to the judge. The
original dilemma will remain.
The list of palliatives could be continued. It might include
greater use of a multitude of judges' 16 or the creation of a
strong representational structure.' 7 I am afraid, however, it
would leave us in the same position - some independence
restored, but still searching for a judge who is truly independ-
ent - knowing full well that as long as we want to use
adjuciation to reform practical reality, that aspiration can
never be fully satisfied. Some solace might be found in the
fact that the dilemma is not wholly the judge's making. The
dilemma arises not just from the judge's desire to be effica-
cious, but from a desire to be efficacious in a world in which
his power is limited and in which the critical social actors are
recalcitrant, unyielding to his judgment as to the meaning of
the Constitution. On this account, the social order as well as
the judge is implicated in the making of the dilemma, but it
does not make the dilemma any less genuine. Independence is
a critical element in the process that legitimates the judicial
function, for having us believe that judges can articulate and
elaborate the meaning of our constitutional values, and yet, to
fully discharge that function, to give that meaning a practical
reality, judges are forced to surrender some of their independ-
ence.
At this point one might be tempted to turn back in despair,
renounce the adjudicative enterprise altogether, or escape to
the formalism represented by the tailoring principle. These
alternatives must be resisted at all costs: they deny an impor-
tant social function, the meaning-giving enterprise implicit in
constitutionalism itself, or, in the case of the tailoring princi-
ple, distort the nature of an important facet of this enter-
prise. Alternatively, we could confine the judge to the decla-
rations of rights, and insist that he abandon his desire to be
efficacious. That would resolve the core dilemma, and yet it
would require a detachment or an indifference to this world
116 Lessons may be found in the obligation to use a different judge in cases of
direct contempt. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsyl-
vania, 400 U.S. 455 (,971).
117 See George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy, 66
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 751 (1972).
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that does not seem to me either to be a virtue or a mode of
behavior that is within the reach of most American judges.
The desire to be efficacious need not be seen as an assertion
of will, but as a willingness of the judge to assume responsi-
bility for practical reality and its consonance with the Consti-
tution.
The i96o's were an extraordinary period in the history of
the judiciary in America, and among its many lessons, that
era suggests the possibility of still another alternative: to live
with the dilemma. The judge might be seen as forever strad-
dling two worlds, the world of the ideal and the world of the
practical, the world of the public value and the world of
subjective preference, the world of the Constitution and the
world of politics. He derives his legitimacy from only one, but
necessarily finds himself in the other. He among all the agen-
cies of government is in the best position to discover the true
meaning of our constitutional values, but, at the same time,
he is deeply constrained, indeed sometimes even compromised,
by his desire - his wholly admirable desire - to give that
meaning a reality.
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